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Recent methods have adapted the well-established AGM and belief base frameworks for belief change to
cover belief revision in logic programs. In this study here, we present two new sets of belief change operators
for logic programs. They focus on preserving the explicit relationships expressed in the rules of a program,
a feature that is missing in purely semantic approaches that consider programs only in their entirety. In
particular, operators of the latter class fail to satisfy preservation and support, two important properties for
belief change in logic programs required to ensure intuitive results.
We address this shortcoming of existing approaches by introducing partial meet and ensconcement con-
structions for logic program belief change, which allow us to define syntax-preserving operators that satisfy
preservation and support. Our work is novel in that our constructions not only preserve more information
from a logic program during a change operation than existing ones, but they also facilitate natural defini-
tions of contraction operators, the first in the field to the best of our knowledge.
In order to evaluate the rationality of our operators, we translate the revision and contraction postulates
from the AGM and belief base frameworks to the logic programming setting. We show that our operators
fully comply with the belief base framework and formally state the interdefinability between our operators.
We further propose an algorithm that is based on modularising a logic program to reduce partial meet
and ensconcement revisions or contractions to performing the operation only on the relevant modules of
that program. Finally, we compare our approach to two state-of-the-art logic program revision methods and
demonstrate that our operators address the shortcomings of one and generalise the other method.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A key ingredient for any machine to be considered ‘artificially intelligent’ is a system
to represent and reason about knowledge in the application domain of interest [Mc-
Carthy 1958]. In analogy to a human brain, such a system should be capable of storing
information in some knowledge base and reasoning over existing information to de-
duce new information. Moreover, information in a knowledge base should be amenable
to change, whether it be adding, deleting, or modifying information. The study of belief
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change [Doyle 1979; Fagin et al. 1983; Ga¨rdenfors 1988; Hansson 1999; Harper 1976;
Levi 1980] concerns itself exactly with these kinds of dynamics in knowledge bases. It
aims at providing mechanisms to change a knowledge base whenever new information
is acquired. The majority of these mechanisms rely on two fundamental principles:
the principle of primacy of new information, stating that new information should be
treated with priority over existing information in the knowledge base, and the princi-
ple of minimal change, stating that as much existing information as possible should be
preserved during a change operation [Dalal 1988].
An important endeavour to guide change operations on a knowledge base and by
now the most widely-adopted belief change paradigm is the so-called AGM framework,
named after the initials of the author trio [Alchourro´n et al. 1985]. It classifies the pos-
sible changes to a knowledge base as expansion, revision, and contraction operations.
In an expansion, new information is incorporated into a knowledge base, regardless of
any inconsistencies that may arise. A revision operation also incorporates new infor-
mation into a knowledge base, but in such a way that the resulting knowledge base is
consistent. This is achieved by discarding some existing information. During a contrac-
tion, no new information is added to a knowledge base but some existing information
is removed from it. On the one hand, the framework provides a set of postulates that
each rational change operator should satisfy, and, on the other hand, defines specific
constructions of expansion, revision, and contraction that satisfy these criteria. While
the underlying assumption of the AGM framework is that any information implied by
a knowledge base is represented explicitly in the knowledge base, the belief base frame-
work of belief change [Fuhrmann 1991; Hansson 1989; Rott 1992] does not require this
assumption. Postulates and constructions for expansion, revision, and contraction op-
erators in the belief base framework have been defined to complement those from the
AGM model (Hansson [1999] provides a summary).
While the AGM and belief base frameworks have been applied to a variety of knowl-
edge representation formalisms (an overview is given by Wassermann [2011]), work
on an adaptation to knowledge representation in the form of logic programs [Colmer-
auer and Roussel 1996; Kowalski 1974; Lloyd 1987] has been slow to progress. A major
challenge in the adaptation of the AGM and belief base frameworks to logic program-
ming lies in the semantics of logic programs. While the frameworks and their previ-
ous adaptations are based on monotonic semantics, the standard answer set semantics
[Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988] of logic programs is nonmonotonic. Only recently have
operators been proposed for belief revision in logic programs. Program-level revision
[Delgrande 2010] and screened semi-revision [Kru¨mpelmann and Kern-Isberner 2012]
are initial approaches to logic program revision, yet have strict limitations in their
expressiveness due to the nonmonotonicity of the underlying answer set semantics.
A breakthrough arrived with the distance-based approach [Delgrande et al. 2013] to
logic program revision, which rests upon characterising an agent’s beliefs in terms of
the set of SE (strong equivalence) models [Lifschitz et al. 2001; Turner 2003] of a logic
program. A logic program P has the same set of SE models as a program Q if and only
if, for any programR, the answer sets of P combinedwith R are exactly the same as the
answer sets of Q combined with R. SE model semantics provides an alternative, mono-
tonic characterisation for logic programs and thus circumvents obstacles presented by
nonmonotonicity. To revise a program P by a program Q, the distance-based revision
operator determines those SE models from the set of SE models of Q that are closest
to the SE models of P .
Even though the distance-based approach is a major milestone for logic program re-
vision, it has some critical shortcomings. Firstly, as it relies on the set of SE models of
an entire program as the representation of beliefs expressed by the program, it oper-
ates on the program-level only. This means that a program may freely be substituted
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with any other that has the same set of SE models and the revision output will remain
the same. However, the information expressed by a program is more than just its set
of SE models – a program also encodes relationships between the atoms occurring in
it [Leite and Pereira 1998]. Such relationships are expressed on the rule-level, by the
individual rules contained in a program. By neglecting information expressed on the
rule-level, the distance-based approach fails to satisfy the property of preservation [In-
oue and Sakama 2004] and the property of support [Inoue and Sakama 2004; Slota
and Leite 2013]. This leads to some highly unintuitive results, as illustrated by the
following two examples.
It is the 31st of December and I plan to drive from San Jose to San Francisco
to see the New Year fireworks. Due to previous experience I believe that if
there is heavy fog in San Francisco, then the city will cancel the fireworks.
It has been clear and sunny for the last days, so I believe that it will not be
foggy today either. I decide to check the weather forecast nonetheless, which
says that there will be heavy fog tonight in San Francisco. Since I trust
the forecast more than my own meteorological skills, I have to revise my
beliefs. By employing the distance-based revision method, I would end up
believing that it will be foggy, while being undecided whether the fireworks
will be cancelled. Formally, let P1 = {⊥ ← fog., no fireworks ← fog. } and
Q1 = { fog. }. Then the distance-based revision of P1 by Q1 would return
{ fog. }.
I drive from San Jose to San Francisco every morning for work. I can use
the 101 highway or the 280 freeway, but neither is particularly quicker.
However, I believe that if there are roadworks on the 101, then the 280
is quicker. I was told by a friend that there are roadworks on the 101 cur-
rently, so I have been travelling on the 280. Now I hear on the radio that
the roadworks finished and revise my beliefs. Using the distance-based
revision method, I would end up with the belief that there are no road-
works on the 101, while still keeping the belief that the 280 is quicker.
Formally, let P2 = { 101 roadworks., 280 quicker ← 101 roadworks. } and
Q2 = {⊥ ← 101 roadworks. }. Then the distance-based revision of P2 by Q2
would return {⊥ ← 101 roadworks., 280 quicker. }.
The first example demonstrates that the distance-based approach does not satisfy
the preservation property. I do not conclude that the fireworks will be cancelled, even
though I know now that it will be foggy. The revision operation simply disregards the
second rule of P1, which expresses the relationship between fog and fireworks can-
cellation. The reason for this is that the set of SE models of the first rule of P1 is a
proper subset of the set of SE models of the second rule. Thus, the set of SE models
of P1 is exactly the set of SE models of the first rule, which means that the second
rule is invisible in the program-level view. The second example demonstrates that the
distance-based approach does not satisfy the support property. I keep believing that
the 280 is quicker, although the grounds to believe so do not hold any longer. The prob-
lem is that the dependency relationship between 280 quicker and 101 roadworks is
captured on the rule-level, by the set of SE models of the second rule of P2, but not on
the program-level, by the set of SE models of the entire program P2.
A second shortcoming is that the distance-based approach makes the definition of a
corresponding contraction operator difficult to come by. In classical logic, contraction
can be defined in terms of revision by using the negation of a sentence. However, in
logic programswe do not have the luxury of negation of a program. A workaround could
be to use the complement of the set of SE models of the contracting program Q and
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select from this set the SE models that are closest to the ones of the initial program P .
Yet, such a method may return SE models that are somewhat unrelated to P or Q,
especially when the complement consists of a large number of SE models.
Themotivation for this work is to address these limitations. In particular, we propose
here, on the one hand, revision operators that take into account information expressed
by a program on the program-level and the rule-level in order to avoid such unintuitive
results as just shown. On the other hand, we present corresponding contraction oper-
ators with similar properties. The main contributions of this work can be summarised
as follows.
—We provide new translations of the AGM and belief base revision and contraction pos-
tulates to the logic programming setting and establish formal relationships between
these postulates and to previous translations.
—We introduce two sets of belief change operators for logic programs – partial meet
revision and contraction operators and ensconcement revision and contraction op-
erators – and show that each operator satisfies the relevant belief base revision or
contraction postulates as well as the majority of AGM revision or contraction pos-
tulates. We also demonstrate that our partial meet and ensconcement revision op-
erators address the shortcomings of the distance-based approach to logic program
revision and that they are generalisations of the screened semi-revision approach for
logic programs.
—We establish that our ensconcement operators are generalisations of our partial meet
operators and that the Levi and Harper identities hold for our operators. We fur-
ther show that the outcome of a revision or contraction operation remains unaffected
whether an ensconcement is defined over rules or subsets of a program.
—We propose an algorithm to optimise the operations of partial meet and ensconcement
revision or contraction of a logic program.
—We connect our results to the classic belief change frameworks by showing that our
operators possess similar properties as their counterparts in propositional logic, that
they conform fully to the belief base framework, and that they align more closely to
the AGM and belief base frameworks than the distance-based revision operators.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We first provide the preliminar-
ies in Section 2 and review related work in Section 3. We then present new transla-
tions of the AGM and belief base revision and contraction postulates to logic programs
in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6, we propose partial meet and ensconcement belief
change operators for logic programs, respectively, and evaluate their suitability with
respect to the relevant postulates and existing operators. We establish the formal re-
lationships between our operators in Section 7. In Section 8, we present an algorithm
to optimise the operations of revision or contraction on a logic program. We finally dis-
cuss our findings in relation to the classic belief change frameworks in Section 9 and
conclude with a summary in Section 10. Preliminary results from Sections 5 and 8
were presented in a conference paper [Binnewies et al. 2015].
2. PRELIMINARIES
We first briefly recall syntax and semantics of logic programs and then review the
foundations of belief change.
2.1. Logic Programming
Let A be a finite vocabulary of propositional atoms. A rule r over A has the form
a1; . . . ; ak;not b1; . . . ;not bl ← c1, . . . , cm, not d1, . . . , not dn. (1)
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Here, all ai, bi, ci, di ∈ A and k, l,m, n ≥ 0. The operators ‘not’, ‘;’, and ‘,’ stand for de-
fault negation, disjunction, and conjunction, respectively. For convenience, letH+(r) =
{a1, . . . , ak}, H−(r) = {b1, . . . , bl}, B+(r) = {c1, . . . , cm}, and B−(r) = {d1, . . . , dn}. If
k = 1 and l = m = n = 0, then r is called a fact and we omit ‘←’; if k = l = 0, then r is a
constraint and we denote the empty disjunction by ⊥. Let At(r) and At(R) denote the
set of all atoms that occur in a rule of the form (1) and in a set of rules R, respectively.
A (generalised) logic program is a finite set of rules of the form (1). We write LPA for
the class of all logic programs that can be constructed from A.
An interpretation Y ⊆ A satisfies a program P , denoted by Y |= P , if and only if (iff)
it is a model of all rules under the standard definition for propositional logic such
that each rule represents a conditional and default negation is transcribed to classical
negation. LetMod(P ) = { Y | Y |= P }. An answer set [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988] of a
program P is any subset-minimal interpretation Y that satisfies the reduct of P with
respect to Y , denoted by P Y and defined as:
P Y = {H+(r) ← B+(r) | r ∈ P,H−(r) ⊆ Y, and B−(r) ∩ Y = ∅ }.
The set of all answer sets of P is denoted by AS(P ).
An SE interpretation is a tuple (X,Y ) of interpretations withX ⊆ Y ⊆ A. We usually
write, e.g., (ab, ab) instead of ({a, b}, {a, b}) for legibility. Let SE be the set of all SE inter-
pretations over A. For any set S of SE interpretations, by S we denote the complement
of S with respect to SE , that is, S = SE \S. An SE interpretation (X,Y ) is an SE model
[Turner 2003] of a program P iff Y |= P and X |= P Y . The set of all SE models of P is
denoted by SE(P ) and P is satisfiable iff SE(P ) 6= ∅. An interpretation Y is an answer
set of P iff (Y, Y ) ∈ SE(P ) and, for any X ⊂ Y , (X,Y ) 6∈ SE(P ). Often we drop explicit
set notation for rules and their union, e.g., for rules r, r′ ∈ P , we use SE(r) to denote
SE({r}) and write SE(r∪r′) instead of SE({r}∪{r′}). Note that SE(P ) =
⋂
r∈P SE(r).
Given two programs P andQ, we say that P is strongly equivalent [Lifschitz et al. 2001]
to Q, denoted by P ≡s Q, iff SE(P ) = SE(Q), and P implies Q, denoted by P |=s Q,
iff SE(P ) ⊆ SE(Q). In the particular case of SE(P ) ⊂ SE(Q), we say that P strictly
implies Q. The relation |=s is antitonic with respect to the program subset relation,
i.e., Q ⊆ P implies P |=s Q. Furthermore, we write |=s P to express SE(P ) = SE .
SE models are a refinement of answer sets as they provide more information about
the atoms in a program and their dependencies. For example, each of the following
programs P1, P2, . . . , P9 over A = {a, b} has {∅} as the only answer set but the sets of
SE models are different for each program:
P1 = {⊥ ← a. } SE(P1) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, b), (b, b)}
P2 = {⊥ ← b. } SE(P2) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, a), (a, a)}
P3 = { a← b. } SE(P3) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, a), (a, a), (∅, ab), (a, ab), (ab, ab)}
P4 = { b← a. } SE(P4) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, b), (b, b), (∅, ab), (b, ab), (ab, ab)}
P5 = {⊥ ← a, b. } SE(P5) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, a), (a, a), (∅, b), (b, b)}
P6 = {⊥ ← not a, b. } SE(P6) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, a), (a, a), (∅, ab), (a, ab), (b, ab), (ab, ab)}
P7 = {⊥ ← a, not b. } SE(P7) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, b), (b, b), (∅, ab), (a, ab), (b, ab), (ab, ab)}
P8 = { a;not b. } SE(P8) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, a), (a, a), (a, ab), (ab, ab)}
P9 = {not a; b. } SE(P9) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, b), (b, b), (b, ab), (ab, ab)}
Informally, we can interpret the content of an SE model (X,Y ) on a three-valued scale.
Any atoms in X are true, any atoms not in Y are false, and any atoms in Y but not
in X are undefined.
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2.2. Belief Change
The AGM framework [Alchourro´n et al. 1985; Ga¨rdenfors 1988] defines expansion,
revision, and contraction as the change operations on a body of beliefs held by an agent,
called a belief state henceforth, in light of some new information. In an expansion,
new beliefs are incorporated into a belief state, regardless of any inconsistencies that
may arise. A revision operation also incorporates new beliefs into a belief state, but in
such a way that the resulting belief state is consistent. This is achieved by discarding
some existing beliefs. During a contraction, some beliefs in a belief state are removed
without adding new beliefs.
In the AGM framework, a belief state is modelled as a belief set, defined as a set
of sentences from some logic-based language L that is closed under logical conse-
quence, i.e., when all beliefs implied by a knowledge base are explicitly represented
in the knowledge base. Let K be a belief set, φ and ψ sentences, K⊥ denote the in-
consistent belief set, and Cn(·) stand for a logical consequence function. By φ ≡ ψ
we mean Cn(φ) = Cn(ψ). The expansion of K by φ, written K ⊕ φ, is defined as
K ⊕ φ = Cn(K ∪ {φ}). The AGM framework provides a set of postulates that any
rational revision operator should satisfy. The postulates are listed as follows, where ⊛
represents a revision operator.
(⊛1) K ⊛ φ is a belief set
(⊛2) φ ∈ K ⊛ φ
(⊛3) K ⊛ φ ⊆ K ⊕ φ
(⊛4) If ¬φ 6∈ K, then K ⊕ φ ⊆ K ⊛ φ
(⊛5) K ⊛ φ = K⊥ iff ⊢ ¬φ
(⊛6) If φ1 ≡ φ2, then K ⊛ φ1 = K ⊛ φ2
(⊛7) K ⊛ (φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ (K ⊛ φ)⊕ ψ
(⊛8) If ¬ψ 6∈ K ⊛ φ, then (K ⊛ φ)⊕ ψ ⊆ K ⊛ (φ ∧ ψ)
(⊛1) requires that the outcome of a revision is a belief set. (⊛2) states that the revis-
ing sentence is contained in the revised belief set. (⊛3) asserts that a belief set revised
by a sentence is always a subset of the belief set expanded by that sentence. (⊛3) and
(⊛4) together state that revision coincides with expansion in cases when the revising
sentence is consistent with the initial belief set. (⊛5) guarantees that a revision out-
come is consistent, unless the revising sentence is logically impossible. (⊛6) ensures
that logically equivalent sentences lead to the same revision outcomes. (⊛7) and (⊛8)
together enforce K to be minimally changed in a revision by both φ and ψ, such that
the outcome is the same as the expansion of K ⊛ φ by ψ, provided that ψ is consistent
with K ⊛ φ.
In the concrete case that a belief state is represented as a finite set of propositional
formulas, the following set of postulates is equivalent to the set (⊛1)–(⊛8) [Katsuno
and Mendelzon 1991]. Let φ, ψ, µ be propositional formulas.
(⊛1KM) φ⊛ ψ implies ψ
(⊛2KM) If φ ∧ ψ is satisfiable, then φ⊛ ψ ≡ φ ∧ ψ
(⊛3KM) If ψ is satisfiable, then φ⊛ ψ is satisfiable
(⊛4KM) If φ1 ≡ φ2 and ψ1 ≡ ψ2, then φ1 ⊛ ψ1 ≡ φ2 ⊛ ψ2
(⊛5KM) (φ ⊛ ψ) ∧ µ implies φ⊛ (ψ ∧ µ)
(⊛6KM) If (φ⊛ ψ) ∧ µ is satisfiable, then φ⊛ (ψ ∧ µ) implies (φ ⊛ ψ) ∧ µ
(⊛1KM) requires that the revising formula can be derived from the revision outcome.
(⊛2KM) specifies that revision corresponds to conjunction whenever the revising for-
mula is consistent with the formula to be revised. (⊛3KM) guarantees consistency of
a revision outcome whenever the revising formula is consistent. (⊛4KM) states that
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revising logically equivalent formulas by logically equivalent formulas leads to logi-
cally equivalent results. (⊛5KM) and (⊛6KM) together stipulate that the revision by
a conjunction leads to the same outcome as revising by one conjunct and then forming
the conjunction with the other conjunct, provided that the conjunction thus formed is
satisfiable.
The AGM framework also provides a set of postulates that any rational contraction
operator should satisfy. The postulates are given below, where ⊖ represents a contrac-
tion operator.
(⊖1) K ⊖ φ is a belief set
(⊖2) K ⊖ φ ⊆ K
(⊖3) If φ 6∈ K, then K ⊖ φ = K
(⊖4) If 6⊢ φ, then φ 6∈ K ⊖ φ
(⊖5) K ⊆ (K ⊖ φ) ⊕ φ
(⊖6) If φ1 ≡ φ2, then K ⊖ φ1 = K ⊖ φ2
(⊖7) K ⊖ φ ∩K ⊖ ψ ⊆ K ⊖ φ ∧ ψ
(⊖8) If φ 6∈ K ⊖ φ ∧ ψ, then K ⊖ φ ∧ ψ ⊆ K ⊖ φ
(⊖1) requires that the outcome of a contraction is a belief set. (⊖2) ensures that
no new beliefs are introduced during a contraction. (⊖3) stipulates that the belief set
remains unchanged during a contraction operation whenever the sentence to be con-
tracted is not contained in it. (⊖4) states that a contracting sentence is not a logical
consequence of the contracted belief set, unless the sentence is a tautology. (⊖5) re-
quires that the original belief set can be recovered by expanding a contracted belief set
by the sentence that was contracted. (⊖6) ensures that logically equivalent sentences
lead to the same contraction outcomes. (⊖7) guarantees that any beliefs retained in a
contraction by φ and in a contraction by ψ are also retained in a contraction by both φ
and ψ. (⊖8) specifies that any beliefs retained in a contraction by both φ and ψ are also
retained in a contraction by φ, whenever φ itself is not retained.
The appropriateness of the Recovery postulate (⊖5) within this set of contraction
postulates has been discussed intensively [Fuhrmann 1991; Hansson 1991; Makinson
1987; Nayak 1994; Niedere´e 1991]. To replace the Recovery postulate in expressing
that no beliefs should be retracted unduly during a contraction operation, alternative
postulates were proposed. Hansson [1991] offered the following postulate:
(⊖5r) If ψ ∈ K \ (K ⊖ φ), then there is a set K ′ such that K ⊖ φ ⊆ K ′ ⊂ K and
φ 6∈ Cn(K ′) but φ ∈ Cn(K ′ ∪ {ψ}).
The Relevance postulate (⊖5r) states that a sentence ψ should only be removed during
the contraction of a sentence φ from K if ψ is relevant for implying φ. In the presence
of (⊖1)–(⊖3), (⊖5) is equivalent to (⊖5r) in propositional logic [Hansson 1991]. More
recently, Ferme´ et al. [2008] presented the following Disjunctive Elimination postu-
late (⊖5de):
(⊖5de) If ψ ∈ K \ (K ⊖ φ), then K ⊖ φ 6⊢ φ ∨ ψ.
According to (⊖5de), a sentence ψ should only be removed during the contraction of a
sentence φ fromK if the contraction result does not imply the disjuntion of φ and ψ. In
the presence of (⊖2)–(⊖3), (⊖5r) is equivalent to (⊖5de) in propositional logic [Ferme´
et al. 2008].
One of the classic constructions to implement belief change is partial meet contrac-
tion [Alchourro´n et al. 1985], which we recapitulate here. A set K ′ is a remainder set
of a set K ⊆ L with respect to a sentence φ iff
a) K ′ ⊆ K,
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b) K ′ 6⊢ φ, and
c) for any K ′′ with K ′ ⊂ K ′′ ⊆ K : K ′′ ⊢ φ.
The set of all remainder sets of K with respect to φ is denoted by K⊥φ. A selection
function γ for a belief set K is a function such that (i) if K⊥φ 6= ∅, then ∅ 6= γ(K⊥φ) ⊆
K⊥φ and (ii) γ(K⊥φ) = {K} otherwise. A partial meet contraction operator⊖γ forK is
defined as: K ⊖γ φ =
⋂
γ(K⊥φ). The following representation theorem shows that the
set of postulates (⊖1)–(⊖6) exactly characterises the class of partial meet contraction
operators.
THEOREM 2.1. [Alchourro´n et al. 1985] For any belief set K, ⊖γ is a partial meet
contraction operator for K iff ⊖γ satisfies (⊖1)–(⊖6).
By placing further restrictions on the selection function, the representation the-
orem can be extended to the full set of postulates. A transitively relational selec-
tion function γ′ for K is determined by a transitive relation ✂ over 2K such that
γ′(K⊥φ) = {K ′ ∈ K⊥φ | K ′′ ✂ K ′ for all K ′′ ∈ K⊥φ }. A partial meet contraction
operator ⊖γ′ determined by a transitively relational selection function γ′ is called a
transitively relational partial meet contraction operator.
THEOREM 2.2. [Alchourro´n et al. 1985] For any belief set K, ⊖γ′ is a transitively
relational partial meet contraction operator for K iff ⊖γ′ satisfies (⊖1)–(⊖8).
A corresponding (transitively relational) partial meet revision operator ⊛γ (⊛γ′) that
satisfies (⊛1)–(⊛6) ((⊛1)–(⊛8)) can be obtained from a (transitively relational) partial
meet contraction operator via the Levi identity: K ⊛ φ = (K ⊖ ¬φ) ⊕ φ [Ga¨rdenfors
1981; Levi 1977]. The inverse identity, which constructs a contraction operator from a
revision operator, is due to Harper [1976]: K ⊖ φ = K ∩ (K ⊛ ¬φ).
While the AGM approach provides an effective framework to conduct belief change,
the representation of belief states in the form of belief sets has some shortcomings (see
[Hansson 1999] for a detailed discussion). From a practical perspective, main draw-
backs of belief sets are that they are generally large objects, since all logical conse-
quences of all beliefs are contained, and that it is impossible to distinguish between
inconsistent belief sets, as inconsistent belief sets consist of the entire language. Belief
bases [Fuhrmann 1991; Hansson 1989; Rott 1992] are an alternative representation
of belief states. A belief base is a set of sentences from L that is not necessarily closed
under logical consequence.
Hansson [1993] defined a partial meet base contraction operator −γ for a belief
base B as B −γ φ =
⋂
γ(B⊥φ) and showed that the following set of postulates exactly
characterises the class of partial meet base contraction operators.
(−1) B − φ ⊆ B
(−2) If 6⊢ φ, then φ 6∈ Cn(B − φ)
(−3) If ψ ∈ B \ (B−φ), then there is a set B′ such that B−φ ⊆ B′ ⊂ B and φ 6∈ Cn(B′)
but φ ∈ Cn(B′ ∪ {ψ})
(−4) If it holds for all B′ ⊆ B that φ ∈ Cn(B′) iff ψ ∈ Cn(B′), then B − φ = B − ψ
THEOREM 2.3. [Hansson 1993] For any belief base B, −γ is a partial meet base
contraction operator for B iff −γ satisfies (−1)–(−4).
Note that (−1), (−2), and (−3) in the belief base setting correspond directly to (⊖2),
(⊖4), and (⊖5r) in the AGM setting, respectively. (−4) states that if any parts of B
which imply φ also imply ψ, then the same parts of B will be retained in a contraction
by φ as in a contraction by ψ.
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He also defined a corresponding partial meet base revision operator >γ for a belief
base B as B >γ φ = (B −γ ¬φ) ∪ {φ} and showed that the following set of postulates
exactly characterises the class of partial meet base revision operators.
(>1) φ ∈ B > φ
(>2) B > φ ⊆ B ∪ {φ}
(>3) If ψ ∈ B \ (B > φ), then there is a set B′ such that B > φ ⊆ B′ ⊂ B ∪ {φ} and
¬φ 6∈ Cn(B′) but ¬φ ∈ Cn(B′ ∪ {ψ})
(>4) If it holds for all B′ ⊆ B that B′ ∪ {φ} is consistent iff B′ ∪ {ψ} is consistent, then
B ∩ (B > φ) = B ∩ (B > ψ)
(>5) If 6⊢ ¬φ, then ¬φ 6∈ Cn(B > φ)
THEOREM 2.4. [Hansson 1993] For any belief base B, >γ is a partial meet base
revision operator for B iff >γ satisfies (>1)–(>5).
The pendants to (>1) and (>2) in the AGM framework are (⊛2) and (⊛3), respectively.
(>3) requires ψ to only be removed from B if it would otherwise make the revision
outcome inconsistent. (>4) mandates that if any parts of B which are consistent with φ
are also consistent with ψ, then the same parts of B will be retained in a revision by φ
as in a revision by ψ. (>5) is a weaker version of (⊛5).
Williams [1994] proposed further belief change operators for belief bases, which rely
on an ordering over the sentences contained in a belief base, called ensconcement. An
ensconcement associated with a belief base B is any total preorder4 on B that satisfies
the following conditions.
(41) For all φ ∈ B : {ψ ∈ B | φ ≺ ψ } 6⊢ φ
(42) For all φ, ψ ∈ B : φ 4 ψ iff ⊢ ψ
A sentence ψ is at least as ensconced as a sentence φ iff φ 4 ψ, and ψ is strictly
more ensconced than φ iff φ ≺ ψ. Condition (41) states that sentences which are
strictly more ensconced than a sentence φ do not entail φ. Condition (42) requires
any tautologies in the belief base to be most ensconced. The proper cut of B for φ is
cut≺(φ) = {ψ ∈ B | {χ ∈ B | ψ 4 χ } 6⊢ φ }. An ensconcement contraction operator ⊖4
for B is defined as: ψ ∈ B ⊖4 φ iff ψ ∈ B and either ⊢ φ or cut≺(φ) ∪ {¬φ} ⊢ ψ. An
ensconcement revision operator ⊛4 for B is defined as: ψ ∈ B ⊛4 φ iff (i) ψ = φ or (ii)
ψ ∈ B and either ⊢ ¬φ or cut≺(¬φ) ∪ {φ} ⊢ ψ.
An ensconcement contraction operator ⊖4 satisfies (−1), (−2), and
(−5) If φ 6∈ Cn(B), then B − φ = B
(−6) If φ1 ≡ φ2, then B − φ1 = B − φ2
(−7) B − φ ∧ ψ = B − φ or B − φ ∧ ψ = B − ψ or B − φ ∧ ψ = B − φ ∩B − ψ
(−8) If ψ ∈ B \ (B − φ), then B − φ 6⊢ φ ∨ ψ
THEOREM 2.5. [Ferme´ et al. 2008] Let B be a belief base and ⊖4 an ensconcement
contraction operator for B. Then ⊖4 satisfies (−1), (−2), and (−5)–(−8).1
Postulates (−5), (−6), and (−8) correspond directly to (⊖3), (⊖6), and (⊖5de) in the
AGM setting, respectively. (−7) states that a contraction by a conjuntion is the result
of contracting by the first of the conjuncts, the result of contracting by the second of the
conjuncts, or the common part of these two results. In the belief base framework, the
relationship between (−3) and (−8) is different to the one between (⊖5r) and (⊖5de) in
the AGM framework: (−3) implies (−8) but not vice versa [Ferme´ et al. 2008].
1Please note that the proof of the representation theorem (Theorem 14 in [Ferme´ et al. 2008]) contains an
error, as acknowledged by the authors. The theorem only holds in the direction from operator to postulates
as stated above.
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3. RELATED WORK
One of the key developments for adapting the AGM framework of belief change to
logic programs came with the distance-based approach to logic program revision [Del-
grande et al. 2013]. It is built on the monotonic SE semantics for logic programs and
understands a belief state as the set of SE models of a program. In that work, the
formula-based revision postulates (⊛1KM)–(⊛6KM) are translated to logic programs
as follows, where a revision operator ∗ is a function from LPA × LPA to LPA and the
expansion of P by Q, denoted P ∔ Q, is understood as P ∔ Q = R such that R ∈ LPA
and SE(R) = SE(P ) ∩ SE(Q).
(∗1m) P ∗Q |=s Q
(∗2m) If P ∔Q is satisfiable, then P ∗Q ≡s P ∔Q
(∗3m) If Q is satisfiable, then P ∗Q is satisfiable
(∗4m) If P1 ≡s P2 and Q1 ≡s Q2, then P1 ∗Q1 ≡s P2 ∗Q2
(∗5m) (P ∗Q)∔R |=s P ∗ (Q ∔R)
(∗6m) If (P ∗Q)∔R is satisfiable, then P ∗ (Q ∔R) |=s (P ∗Q)∔R
The approach adapts two revision operators from classic belief change to logic pro-
grams, namely, Dalal’s revision operator [Dalal 1988] and Satoh’s revision operator
[Satoh 1988]. Informally, to revise a program P by a program Q, the operators return
those SE models from the set of SE models of Q that are closest to the SE models of P ,
where closeness is determined by Dalal’s or Satoh’s notion of distance. Delgrande et al.
[2013] identified that the adaptation of Satoh’s revision operator gives more intuitive
results than the adaptation of Dalal’s revision operator, so we will focus on the former
here. This restriction has no effect on our later discussions.
We briefly restate the definition and main result of the distance-based approach.
Let ∆ stand for the symmetric difference between two sets X,Y , that is, X∆Y = (X \
Y ) ∪ (Y \X). For any two pairs of sets (X,X ′), (Y, Y ′), let
(X,X ′)∆(Y, Y ′) = (X∆Y,X ′∆Y ′);
(X,X ′) ⊆ (Y, Y ′) iff X ′ ⊆ Y ′, and if X ′ = Y ′, then X ⊆ Y ;
(X,X ′) ⊂ (Y, Y ′) iff (X,X ′) ⊆ (Y, Y ′) and (Y, Y ′) * (X,X ′).
For any two sets E,E′, let
σ(E,E′) = {A1 ∈ E | there exists a B1 ∈ E
′ such that for all A2 ∈ E
and for all B2 ∈ E
′ it holds that A1∆B1 ⊆ A2∆B2 }.
DEFINITION 3.1. [Delgrande et al. 2013] Let P,Q ∈ LPA. The revision of P by Q,
denoted P ⋆ Q, is defined as P ⋆ Q = R such that R ∈ LPA and SE(R) = SE(Q) if
SE(P ) = ∅, and otherwise
SE(R) = { (X,Y ) | Y ∈ σ(Mod(Q),Mod(P )), X ⊆ Y,
and if X ⊂ Y, then (X,Y ) ∈ σ(SE(Q), SE(P )) }.
THEOREM 3.1. [Delgrande et al. 2013] The revision operator ⋆ satisfies (∗1m)–(∗5m).
The distance-based approach was extended by two representation theorems [Del-
grande et al. 2013; Schwind and Inoue 2013], stating that any logic program revision
operator satisfying (∗1m)–(∗6m) plus some additional conditions can be characterised
by some preorder over a set of SE models.
Besides the distance-based approach, few other methods for logic program revi-
sion have been proposed. The screened semi-revision approach for logic programs
[Kru¨mpelmann and Kern-Isberner 2012] is based on answer set semantics and aligns
itself with the belief base framework. The approach assumes a belief state to be the
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set of rules belonging to a program and combines adaptations of the constructions of
semi-revision [Hansson 1997] and screened revision [Makinson 1997] into a screened
consolidation operation for logic programs. The consolidation operator first finds all
maximal subsets of one program that are consistent with a second program under an-
swer set semantics, then selects exactly one of these subsets, and returns this subset
together with the second program as the outcome.
We review the formal definitions of the screened consolidation operator and the main
result here. Let P ∈ LPA and Q ⊆ P . The set of screened remainder sets of P with
respect to Q is
P⊥!Q = {R | Q ⊆ R ⊆ P,AS(R) 6= ∅ and for all R
′ with R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P : AS(R′) = ∅ }.
A maxichoice selection function γP for P is a function such that for any Q ∈ LPA:
(i) if P⊥!Q 6= ∅, then γP (P⊥!Q) = R for some R ∈ P⊥!Q, and (ii) if P⊥!Q = ∅, then
γP (P⊥!Q) = P .
DEFINITION 3.2. [Kru¨mpelmann and Kern-Isberner 2012] Let P,Q ∈ LPA and γP
be a maxichoice selection function for P . A screened consolidation operator !γP for P is
defined as P !γPQ = γP (P⊥!Q).
The authors propose the following adaptation of partial meet base revision postulates
that any screened consolidation operator ! should satisfy, where ! is a function from
LPA × LPA to LPA, and show that !γP is exactly characterised by these postulates.
(!1) Q ⊆ P !Q
(!2) P !Q ⊆ P
(!3) If r ∈ P \ (P !Q), then AS(P !Q) 6= ∅ and AS(P !Q ∪ {r}) = ∅
(!4) If it holds for all P ′ ⊆ P that AS(P ′ ∪ Q) 6= ∅ iff AS(P ′ ∪ R) 6= ∅, then P ∩ ((P ∪
Q) !Q) = P ∩ ((P ∪R) !R)
(!5) If there exists some P ′ such that Q ⊆ P ′ ⊆ P and AS(P ′) 6= ∅, then AS(P !Q) 6= ∅
THEOREM 3.2. [Kru¨mpelmann and Kern-Isberner 2012] For any P ∈ LPA, !γP is a
screened consolidation operator for P iff !γP satisfies (!1)–(!5).
The program-level approach to logic program revision [Delgrande 2010] is also based
on answer set semantics and assumes the beliefs that make up a belief state to be the
answer sets of a program. The revision operation relies on extending the standard
answer set semantics to three-valued answer set semantics for determining the out-
come. To revise a program P by a program Q, for each three-valued answer set X of Q,
all maximal subsets R of P are selected such that X is a subset of each three-valued
answer set X ′ of R ∪Q. The revision operation returns a set of answer sets that corre-
spond to each X ′ as the result. In the author’s view, the AGM revision postulates (⊛3),
(⊛4), (⊛7), and (⊛8) are inappropriate in the context of nonmonotonic semantics. An
adaptation of the remaining postulates is fulfilled by the revision operation.
The work of Zhuang et al. [2016] concerns itself with the revision of a disjunctive
logic program by another. The authors observed that for a belief revision operator in
a nonmonotonic setting, the task of inconsistency resolving can be done not only by
removing old beliefs but also by adding new beliefs. Based on this observation, they
proposed a variant of partial meet revision. For resolving the inconsistency between
the original and the new beliefs, the variant obtains not only maximal subsets of the
initial program that are consistent with the new one, but also minimal supersets of
the initial program that are consistent with the new one. A representation theorem is
provided. Since the idea of resolving inconsistency by adding new beliefs is beyond the
classic AGM approach, some extra postulates are required to characterise the variant.
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Inoue and Sakama [2004] argue that neither the set of answer sets nor the set of
SE models of a program provide enough detail to revise a program. They illustrate
that while two programs { a., b← not a. } and { a. } have the same set of SE models, and
thus the same set of answer sets, they should be treated differently during a revision
operation, since b should be derived from the first program whenever the rule a. is
discarded. We call this property preservation here. They further argue that revision
operations should distinguish between two programs { a., b. } and { a., b ← a. }. While
these two programs again share the same set of SE models, they too should not be
interchangeable, since after a removal of the rule a., b should not be derived from
the latter program any more. This property has become known as support [Slota and
Leite 2013]. To address these two issues, Inoue and Sakama [2004] introduced a new
notion of program equivalence that is stricter than strong equivalence, called C-update
equivalence: any two programs P1, P2 ∈ LPA are C-update equivalent iff P1 \ P2 ≡s
P2 \ P1.
A relative of belief revision is belief update [Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992]. The
difference between these two is usually understood in the way that belief revision ad-
dresses changes to a belief state brought about by some new information about a static
world, whereas belief update covers changes to a belief state due to dynamics in the
world described by the belief state. Similar to belief revision, the belief update frame-
work prescribes a set of postulates that each rational update operator should satisfy
and provides a construction that complies with it. A number of update operators for
logic programs have been proposed, which differ greatly in the degree of alignment
to the classic belief update framework. On the whole, these approaches rely predom-
inantly on syntactic transformations of programs and return a set of answer sets in-
stead of an updated program as the outcome. The landscape of update operators has
already been reviewed exhaustively in other places, for example, detailed overviews
are given by Delgrande et al. [2004] and Slota [2012]. Of interest in the current con-
text is the exception-based update approach [Slota and Leite 2012], which introduces
RE (robust equivalence) models as an extension of SE models. An RE model of a pro-
gram P is any SE interpretation (X,Y ) such that X |= P Y . The authors regard a belief
state as the collection of the sets of RE models of the rules in a program. In the update
operation, exceptions in the form of RE models are added to those sets of RE models
of the initial program that are incompatible with the RE models of the updating pro-
gram. Incompatibilities between two sets of RE models are determined by differences
in the truth values of atoms occurring in both sets. The update operator satisfies the
majority of the update postulates adapted to logic programs.
An ordered logic program is a tuple (P,<) such that P is a logic program and <
is a preference ordering over the rules in P . Thus, it is conceivable to express the
revision of P by Q as (P ∪ Q,<), where < is some appropriate preference ordering
on P ∪ Q (from [Delgrande et al. 2007], for example), and employ one of the different
semantics proposed [Brewka and Eiter 1999; Delgrande et al. 2003; Schaub and Wang
2003] to obtain the preferred answer sets of this ordered logic program. An ordered
logic program can be transformed into a standard logic program, so that the preferred
answer sets of the former are exactly the answer sets of the latter [Delgrande et al.
2003]. Yet, the transformed program may bear no syntactic relation to the original
program. More importantly, an ordered logic program (P ∪ Q,<) may be inconsistent,
i.e., may have no answer sets, even if P and Q themselves are consistent [Delgrande
et al. 2004]. These characteristics make ordered logic programs rather unsuitable as a
methodology for logic program belief change in general.
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4. ADAPTING THE BELIEF CHANGE FRAMEWORKS
Before we set out to define new constructions of logic program belief change, we trans-
late the ideas of the classic belief change frameworks to the logic programming setting.
We assume that a belief state is represented in the form of a program from LPA and
new information to expand/revise/contract this program comes in the form of another
program from LPA. Even though a consequence relation for logic programs under SE
semantics exists [Eiter et al. 2004; Wong 2008], logic programs are per se not closed
under logical consequence. Thus, it seems natural to align logic program belief change
with the belief base framework. However, as the majority of previous approaches to
logic program revision have focussed on adapting the AGM framework, we will con-
sider it here as well to enable us to draw proper comparisons.
As pointed out above, in the case of propositional knowledge bases the set of formula-
based revision postulates (⊛1KM)–(⊛6KM) is equivalent to the set (⊛1)–(⊛8). How-
ever, in the context of logic programs, it is worth having a closer look at the rela-
tionship between these two sets. Besides adaptations for the purpose of logic program
‘update’ operations under answer set semantics [Eiter et al. 2002] or N2 logic [Osorio
and Cuevas 2007], we find that postulates for logic program revision have usually been
built on the formula-based revision postulates (⊛1KM)–(⊛6KM) until now [Delgrande
et al. 2013; Delgrande et al. 2013; Schwind and Inoue 2013]. They are given in the form
of (∗1m)–(∗6m) (see Section 3). We will now present a new set of postulates for logic
program revision operators, based on the original AGM postulates (⊛1)–(⊛8), and then
explain their relationship to (∗1m)–(∗6m). We will discover that the equivalence of the
two sets of postulates under propositional logic does not carry over to logic programs,
that, in fact, the adaptation of (⊛1)–(⊛8) to logic programs leads to postulates that are
in most cases stricter than (∗1m)–(∗6m), since Q ⊆ P implies P |=s Q but the converse
does not hold.
Let P,Q,R ∈ LPA and a revision operator ∗ be a function from LPA×LPA to LPA. In
the following, we understand expansion, denoted by the operator +, as P +Q = P ∪Q.
(∗1) P ∗Q ∈ LPA
(∗2) Q ⊆ P ∗Q
(∗3) P ∗Q ⊆ P +Q
(∗4) If P +Q is satisfiable, then P +Q ⊆ P ∗Q
(∗5) P ∗Q is satisfiable iff Q is satisfiable
(∗6) If Q ≡s R, then P ∗Q ≡s P ∗R
(∗7) P ∗ (Q +R) ⊆ (P ∗Q) +R
(∗8) If (P ∗Q) +R is satisfiable, then (P ∗Q) +R ⊆ P ∗ (Q+R)
(∗1) is a basic but nonetheless crucial condition that is included in previous adapta-
tions by the requirement that ∗ is a function from LPA × LPA to LPA. (∗2) stipulates
that the revising program is always included in a revision outcome and is a stronger
version of (∗1m) since (∗2) implies (∗1m) but not vice versa. (∗3) requires that a revision
outcome never contains elements not in P or Q. This condition is covered by previous
adaptations only for the case that P +Q is satisfiable in (∗2m). Together, (∗3) and (∗4)
state that revision coincides with expansion if P+Q is satisfiable and thus imply (∗2m)
but not vice versa. (∗5) is the stricter, biconditional version of (∗3m) emphasising the
consistency of a revision outcome. (∗6) guarantees that revision by strongly equiva-
lent programs leads to strongly equivalent results. Unlike belief sets, logic programs
are not closed under logical consequence, so that we cannot expect from two different
bodies of information that are merely strongly equivalent to be equal after a revision.
Thus, the consequent is translated as “P ∗Q ≡s P ∗R” from the original postulate (⊛6).
(∗4m) is stricter than (∗6). (∗7) and (∗8) capture the minimal change condition by re-
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quiring that the revision of P by the expansion of Q with R has the same outcome as
P ∗ Q expanded with R, whenever the latter is satisfiable. (∗7) and (∗8) imply (∗5m)
and (∗6m) but not vice versa, respectively.
A translation of the AGM contraction postulates to logic programs is listed below,
where P,Q,R ∈ LPA and a contraction operator
.− is a function from LPA × LPA to
LPA.
( .−1) P .−Q ∈ LPA
( .−2) P .−Q ⊆ P
( .−3) If P 6|=s Q, then P
.−Q = P
( .−4) If 6|=s Q, then P
.−Q 6|=s Q
( .−5) P ⊆ (P .−Q) +Q
( .−6) If Q ≡s R, then P
.−Q = P .−R
( .−7) (P .−Q) ∩ (P .−R) ⊆ P .− (Q+R)
( .−8) If P .− (Q +R) 6|=s Q, then P
.− (Q +R) ⊆ P .−Q
Any contraction outcome is required to be a logic program by ( .−1) and a subset of
the initial program by ( .−2). According to ( .−3), if the beliefs to be contracted are not
implied by the initial belief state, then nothing is to be retracted. ( .−4) requires that
the beliefs to be contracted are not implied by the contracted belief state, unless they
are tautologies. ( .−5) states that all parts of the initial program P that are discarded in
a contraction by Q can be recovered by a subsequent expansion with Q. ( .−6) ensures
that contraction by strongly equivalent programs leads to the same outcomes. ( .−7)
demands that any parts retained in both P .−Q and P .−R are also retained in P .−(Q+R).
Whenever Q is not implied by the result of a contraction by Q + R, then ( .−8) states
that this result is also retained in a contraction by Q alone.
( .−1), ( .−2), ( .−5), ( .−6), and ( .−7) are direct translations of (⊖1), (⊖2), (⊖5), (⊖6), and
(⊖7), respectively. In the adaptation of (⊖3) to ( .−3), we use “P 6|=s Q” instead of “Q *
P ”. Belief sets are closed under logical consequence, which means K ⊢ φ iff φ ∈ K,
so that either can be used as the condition in (⊖3). However, for logic programs under
SE semantics, we can conclude P |=s Q from Q ⊆ P but not Q ⊆ P from P |=s Q.
Therefore, it is more appropriate to use “P 6|=s Q” than “Q * P ”, as P 6|=s Q implies
Q * P . For the same reason is “P .−Q 6|=s Q” used instead of “Q * P
.−Q” in ( .−4), and
“P .− (Q +R) 6|=s Q” instead of “Q * P
.− (Q +R)” in ( .−8).
We now adapt the belief base revision postulates (>1)–(>5) to logic programs, where
again P,Q,R ∈ LPA and a revision operator ∗ is a function from LPA × LPA to LPA.
(∗1b) Q ⊆ P ∗Q
(∗2b) P ∗Q ⊆ P +Q
(∗3b) If r ∈ P \ (P ∗Q), then there exists a program P ′ such that P ∗Q ⊆ P ′ ⊂ P +Q
and P ′ is satisfiable but P ′ ∪ {r} is not satisfiable
(∗4b) If it holds for all P ′ ⊆ P that P ′ + Q is satisfiable iff P ′ + R is satisfiable, then
P ∩ (P ∗Q) = P ∩ (P ∗R)
(∗5b) If Q is satisfiable, then P ∗Q is satisfiable
All five postulates are direct translations of (>1)–(>5). We have (∗1b) = (∗2) and
(∗2b) = (∗3). (∗3b) requires a rule r to be removed during a revision of P by Q if r
contributes to making P irreconcilable with Q. (∗4b) states that if all subsets of P that
agree with Q also agree with R, then the same elements of P will be retained in a
revision by Q as in a revision by R. (∗5b) guarantees satisfiability of the revision result
whenever the revising program itself is satisfiable. (∗4b) is a stronger version of (∗6)
and (∗5b) is a weaker version of (∗5).
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Finally, we translate the belief base contraction postulates (−1)–(−8) to logic pro-
grams, where P,Q,R ∈ LPA and a contraction operator
.− is a function from LPA ×
LPA to LPA.
( .−1b) P .−Q ⊆ P
( .−2b) If 6|=s Q, then P
.−Q 6|=s Q
( .−3b) If r ∈ P \ (P .−Q), then there exists a program P ′ such that P .−Q ⊆ P ′ ⊂ P and
P ′ 6|=s Q but P ′ ∪ {r} |=s Q
( .−4b) If it holds for all P ′ ⊆ P that P ′ 6|=s Q iff P ′ 6|=s R, then P
.−Q = P .−R
( .−5b) If P 6|=s Q, then P
.−Q = P
( .−6b) If Q ≡s R, then P
.−Q = P .−R
( .−7b) P .− (Q+R) = P .−Q or P .− (Q+R) = P .−R or P .− (Q+R) = (P .−Q)∩ (P .−R)
( .−8b) If r ∈ P \ (P .−Q), then SE(P .−Q) * SE(Q) ∪ SE(r)
These postulates are direct translations of (−1)–(−8). We have ( .−1b) = ( .−2), ( .−2b)
= ( .−4), ( .−5b) = ( .−3), and ( .−6b) = ( .−6). ( .−3b) requires a rule r to only be removed
during the contraction of P by Q if r somehow contributes to implying Q. ( .−4b) states
that if exactly those subsets of P that do not imply Q also do not imply R, then the
same elements of P will be retained in a contraction by Q as in a contraction by R.
As for revision, ( .−4b) is again a stronger version of ( .−6). ( .−7b) specifies that a con-
traction by two programs is the outcome of contracting the first program, the outcome
of contracting the second program, or the intersection of these two outcomes. ( .−8b)
stipulates that r should only be removed if the contracted program has at least one
SE model that is not an SE model of Q or r.
While the postulates (⊖5r) and (⊖5de) are equivalent in the presence of certain other
postulates in the AGM framework for propositional logic, the relationship between the
postulates ( .−3b) and ( .−8b) for logic programs is hierarchical, similar as in the belief
base framework. Satisfaction of ( .−3b) implies satisfaction of ( .−8b) but not vice versa.
PROPOSITION 4.1. Let .− be a contraction operator on LPA. If
.− satisfies ( .−3b),
then it satisfies ( .−8b).
The other direction does not hold as evidenced later by Example 6.6.
The Levi identity [Ga¨rdenfors 1981; Levi 1977] allows us to construct a revision from
a contraction and the Harper identity [Harper 1976] a contraction from a revision. In
their propositional form, they use the classical negation of a sentence α to construct
a revision/contraction by α. For logic programs, we do not have the classical negation
of a program at at our disposal. However, we can abstractly represent the Levi and
Harper identities for logic programs as follows, where Q ∈ LPA iff Q ∈ LPA and
SE(Q) = SE(Q).
DEFINITION 4.1. Let P,Q ∈ LPA. If ∗ is a revision operator for P and
.− a contrac-
tion operator for P , then
P ∗Q = (P .−Q) +Q (Levi identity),
P
.−Q = P ∩ (P ∗Q) (Harper identity).
We adapted the AGM and belief base postulates to logic programs in such a way that
the revising or contracting beliefs are entire programs, not just individual rules. We
have thus essentially defined conditions for what is known in classic belief change as
choice contraction [Fuhrmann andHansson 1994] and revision. In a choice contraction,
a set of sentences may be contracted by either a single sentence or a set of sentences,
for example, K ⊖ {φ, ψ}. Yet, since adapting the postulates that exactly characterise
partial meet choice contractions would yield the postulates ( .−1b)–( .−3b) and ( .−6b), we
do not have to pursue this distinction here further.
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 00, Publication date: March 2000.
00:16 S. Binnewies et al.
5. PARTIAL MEET BELIEF CHANGE
Inspired by our motivation, we begin in this section with defining belief change op-
erators for logic programs that preserve syntactic information, in order to take into
account information on the program-level as well as on the rule-level. We first adapt
the idea of a partial meet construction from classic belief change and formulate revi-
sion and contraction operators for logic programs. We utilise the translations of the
AGM and belief base revision and contraction postulates from the previous section to
test the rationality of our operators.
5.1. Partial Meet Revision
As the basis for our construction of partial meet revision, we define a compatible set
of some program with respect to another program as the dual of a remainder set [Al-
chourro´n et al. 1985].
DEFINITION 5.1 (COMPATIBLE SET). Let P,Q ∈ LPA. The set of compatible sets
of P with respect to Q is
PQ = {R ⊆ P |SE(R) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ and, for all R
′,
R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P implies SE(R′) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ }.
Each compatible set is a maximal subset of P that is consistent with Q under SE
semantics. Each is thus a candidate to be returned together with Q as the outcome
of a revision. To determine exactly which candidate(s) to choose, we employ a selection
function. In the classic case, a selection function for a belief set is defined only over a set
of remainder sets of that belief set (see Section 2.2). Since we plan to use our selection
function for different types of sets, we define it freely with respect to an arbitrary set
as follows.
DEFINITION 5.2 (SELECTION FUNCTION). A selection function γ for a set S is a
function such that:
(1) S ⊆ 2S,
(2) γ(S) ⊆ S, and
(3) if S 6= ∅, then γ(S) 6= ∅.
A special case of our selection function is the following single-choice selection func-
tion, which restricts the selection function γ to select at most one element of a set.
DEFINITION 5.3 (SINGLE-CHOICE SELECTION FUNCTION). A single-choice selec-
tion function γ1 for a set S is a function such that:
(1) S ⊆ 2S,
(2) γ1(S) = R for some R ∈ S, and
(3) if S 6= ∅, then γ1(S) 6= ∅.
We can now define partial meet revision for logic programs as the intersection of the
selected compatible sets added to Q.
DEFINITION 5.4 (PARTIAL MEET REVISION). Let P ∈ LPA and γ be a selection
function for P . A partial meet revision operator ∗γ for P is defined such that for any
Q ∈ LPA:
P ∗γ Q =
{
P +Q if Q is not satisfiable,⋂
γ(PQ) +Q otherwise.
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We illustrate the revision operation by an example. In the examples throughout this
paper, we assume that the underlying language contains only the symbols that occur
in the programs or that are otherwise mentioned explicitly.
EXAMPLE 5.1. Let P = { a., b ← a. } and Q = {⊥ ← a. }. We have PQ = { { b ←
a. } } = γ(PQ), for any selection function γ, and thus P ∗γ Q = { b← a., ⊥ ← a. }. 
The following theorem states which translated AGM revision postulates the revision
operator ∗γ satisfies.
THEOREM 5.1. The revision operator ∗γ satisfies (∗1)–(∗6).
As in the classic case, to satisfy the supplementary revision postulates (∗7)–(∗8) we
would need to place further restrictions on the selection function.
DEFINITION 5.5 (RELATIONAL SELECTION FUNCTION). A transitively relational
selection function γ′ for a set S is a selection function for S such that S ⊆ 2S and:
γ′(S) =
{
∅ if S = ∅,
{R ∈ S | R′ ✂R for all R′ ∈ S } otherwise,
where ✂ is a transitive relation over 2S . The relation ✂ is maximised iff R ⊂ R′ implies
R✁R′ for all R,R′ ∈ 2S .
Yet, even if we make these additional restrictions on a selection function γ′ for P ,
postulates (∗7) and (∗8) are not satisfied by ∗γ′, as shown respectively in the next two
examples. For legibility, we confine the examples to abstract notation. Corresponding
canonical logic programs can be constructed via the method provided by Eiter et al.
[2013].
EXAMPLE 5.2. Let P = {r1, r2, r3}with SE(r1) = {B,C}, SE(r2) = {A,C}, SE(r3) =
{A,B,C}, and {r1, r3} ✂ {r2, r3} ✂ {r1, r3}. If SE(Q) = {A,B} and SE(Q + R) = {A},
then PQ = {{r1, r3}, {r2, r3}} and thus
⋂
γ′(PQ) = {r3}. On the other hand, we have
PQ+R = {{r2, r3}} =
⋂
γ′(PQ+R). This means (P ∗γ′ Q) + R = {r3} ∪ Q ∪ R while
P ∗γ′ (Q+R) = {r2, r3} ∪Q ∪R. 
EXAMPLE 5.3. Let P = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5} with SE(r1) = {A,B,C,D,E}, SE(r2) =
{A,B,C,E}, SE(r3) = {A,E}, SE(r4) = {B,E}, SE(r5) = {D,E}, and {r1, r2} ✁
{r1, r5} ✁ {r1, r2, r3}, {r1, r2, r4}. If SE(Q) = {A,B,C,D} and SE(Q + R) = {C,D},
then PQ = {{r1, r2, r3}, {r1, r2, r4}, {r1, r5}} and PQ+R = {{r1, r2}, {r1, r5}}. It follows
from γ′(PQ) = {{r1, r2, r3}, {r1, r2, r4}} that
⋂
γ′(PQ) = {r1, r2}, while γ′(PQ+R) =
{{r1, r5}} =
⋂
γ′(PQ+R). Therefore, (P ∗γ′ Q) +R = {r1, r2} ∪Q∪R * {r1, r5} ∪Q∪R =
P ∗γ′ (Q+R). Note that SE((P ∗γ′Q)+R) = SE(
⋂
γ′(PQ))∩SE(Q+R) = {A,B,C,E}∩
{C,D} = {C} 6= ∅. 
Our partial meet revision operator does not satisfy the entire set of AGM revision
postulates, only the subset of basic postulates (∗1)–(∗6). This stands in contrast to
the result in classical logics, according to which any partial meet revision operator
is characterised by the set of basic and supplementary revision postulates. However,
that result holds for logically closed belief sets, and when we consider our partial meet
revision operator ∗γ in the light of the belief base framework, we obtain the following
representation theorem.
THEOREM 5.2. An operator ∗γ is a partial meet revision operator for P ∈ LPA
determined by a selection function γ for P iff ∗γ satisfies (∗1b)–(∗5b).
Returning to our motivation, we now give some formal examples to highlight the
drawbacks of the distance-based revision operator and then show how our partial meet
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operator addresses these. Recall that the distance-based revision operator ⋆ does not
specify the structure of the revised program. For convenience, we provide a possible
program that corresponds to the revision outcome for each example below, which we
denote by P ⋆ Q.
1) P = { a., b← a. } P ⋆ Q = {⊥ ← a., b. }
Q = {⊥ ← a. } SE(P ⋆ Q) = {(b, b)}
2) P = {⊥ ← a., b← not a. } P ⋆ Q = { a., b. }
Q = { a. } SE(P ⋆ Q) = {(ab, ab)}
3) P = {⊥ ← a., b← a. } P ⋆ Q = { a. }
Q = { a. } SE(P ⋆ Q) = {(a, a), (a, ab), (ab, ab)}
4) P = { a., b← not a. } P ⋆ Q = {⊥ ← a. }
Q = {⊥ ← a. } SE(P ⋆ Q) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, b), (b, b)}
5) P = { a., b← not c. } P ⋆ Q = { a., b., ⊥ ← c. }
Q = {⊥ ← c. } SE(P ⋆ Q) = {(ab, ab)}
Examples 1) and 2) demonstrate that the revision operator ⋆ does not satisfy the
support property. In Example 1), the initial belief state expressed by program P con-
sists of a and b. In fact, the second rule in P says that we believe b if we believe a.
After revising by the program Q, which simply states that we do not believe a, we still
believe b even though the reason to believe b is not given any more. The explanation
for this is that the revision operator acts on a program-level, not on a rule-level, as it
considers just the SE models of the program in its entirety. However, the dependency
of b on a is not captured by the SE models of the program, only by the SE models of the
second rule. Therefore, b is treated as an independent fact during the revision process.
The situation is similar in Example 2). Here, we initially believe b due to the absence
of belief a. After the revision, we continue to believe b even though the grounds for b do
not exist any more.
Examples 3) and 4) demonstrate that the revision operator ⋆ does not satisfy the
preservation property. In Example 3), according to our initial belief state expressed by
program P , we believe b whenever we believe a, but since we do not believe a currently,
we are indifferent with respect to b at the moment. After revising by programQ, which
states that we now believe a, we are still indifferentwith respect to b. In Example 4), we
initially believe a and would believe b whenever we do not believe a or are indifferent
with respect to a. After revising by Q, which carries the information that we do not
believe a any longer, we are still indifferent with respect to b. In both examples, the
revision operation effectively disregards the second rule in P . However, there is no
justification for such behaviour, as the information in Q only conflicts with the first
rule in P , so that the second rule in P can safely be retained and thus b should be
derived in both examples. This behaviour is due to the fact that the set of SE models
of P is exactly the set of SE models of the first rule. The second rule is invisible in the
program-level view. Consequently, the revision operator returns a result as if P had
consisted merely of the first rule.
Finally, Example 4) stands in stark contrast to Example 5), where the revision op-
eration coincides with expansion. In Example 5), we are indifferent with respect to b
initially and should believe b when we do not believe c or are indifferent with respect
to c. The revising program Q contains information that c indeed does not hold. Thus, b
is incorporated into the new belief state. Yet, Example 4) described a similar scenario
in which b is not included in the resulting belief state, thereby showing a clear discrep-
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ancy to the behaviour of the revision operator in Example 5). Since the set of SE models
of the first rule of P in Example 5) is not a subset of the set of SE models of the second
rule, the latter is preserved during the revision operation. It becomes apparent from
this comparison that some dependencies between atoms expressed in P are respected
by the revision operator ⋆, while others are not.
We now show that our partial meet revision operator ∗γ addresses these shortcom-
ings of the distance-based revision method. Below are the results of our partial meet
revision operator for the five examples above. In each example, the result is indepen-
dent of the choice of selection function.
1) P ∗γ Q = {⊥ ← a., b← a. }
SE(P ∗γ Q) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, b), (b, b)}
2) P ∗γ Q = { a., b← not a. }
SE(P ∗γ Q) = {(a, a), (a, ab), (ab, ab)}
3) P ∗γ Q = { a., b← a. }
SE(P ∗γ Q) = {(ab, ab)}
4) P ∗γ Q = {⊥ ← a., b← not a. }
SE(P ∗γ Q) = {(b, b)}
5) P ∗γ Q = { a., b← not c., ⊥ ← c. }
SE(P ∗γ Q) = {(ab, ab)}
In Examples 1) and 2), the partial meet revision operator preserves the dependency
of b on a and not a, respectively. This is expressed on the syntactic level by the revised
program P ∗γQ and on the semantic level by SE(P ∗γQ). In Examples 3) and 4), our par-
tial meet revision operator takes into account all rules in a program, even those that
may be “invisible” from a purely model-based perspective, as shown by the respective
revision outcomes. Finally, regarding Examples 4) and 5), our partial meet revision op-
erator treats the dependency of b on not a and not c, respectively, in the same manner
and adds b to the belief state uniformly in both examples. The reason for this behaviour
is that our partial meet construction enables us to preserve information expressed on
the rule-level by the individual rules in a program.
Revisiting our two real-life examples from the introduction, we can see that our par-
tial meet revision operator returns the desired results. The first example (“fireworks”)
was formalised as Example 3) above, where a = fog and b = no fireworks. Apply-
ing the revision operator ∗γ returns { fog., no fireworks ← fog. }, that is, it leaves
us with the beliefs that it will be foggy and that there are no fireworks whenever
it is foggy, from which we can derive that the fireworks will be cancelled. The sec-
ond example (“101 or 280”) was formalised as Example 1), where a = 101 roadworks
and b = 280 quicker. Applying the revision operator ∗γ to this example returns
{⊥ ← 101 roadworks., 280 quicker ← 101 roadworks. }, that is, we believe that there
are no roadworks on the 101 and that the 280 is quicker whenever there are roadworks
on the 101, but not that the 280 is still the better choice.
Regarding the screened semi-revision approach by Kru¨mpelmann and Kern-
Isberner [2012] (see Section 3), we can show that our partial meet revision operator ∗γ
is a generalisation of their screened consolidation operator !γP . For any P,Q ∈ LPA
with Q ⊆ P , let
P⊥SE! Q = {R |Q ⊆ R ⊆ P, SE(R) 6= ∅, and, for all R
′,
R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P implies SE(R′) = ∅ },
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and P !SEγP Q = γP (P⊥
SE
! Q).
PROPOSITION 5.1. Let P,Q ∈ LPA. For any maxichoice selection function γP for P ,
there exists a selection function γ for P such that (P ∪Q)!SEγP Q = P ∗γ Q.
Conversely, if we translate our partial meet revision operator ∗γ to answer set se-
mantics and restrict our selection function to be single-choice, then it will coincide with
the screened consolidation operator !γP . Before we can do so, we need to translate our
definition of compatible sets to answer set semantics. For any P,Q ∈ LPA, let
PASQ = {R ⊆ P |AS(R ∪Q) 6= ∅ and, for all R
′,
R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P implies AS(R′ ∪Q) = ∅ }.
DEFINITION 5.6 (PARTIAL MEET REVISION UNDER ANSWER SET SEMANTICS).
Let P ∈ LPA and γ
1 be a single-choice selection function for P . A partial meet revision
operator ∗ASγ1 for P under answer set semantics is defined such that for any Q ∈ LPA:
P ∗ASγ1 Q =
{
P ∪Q if AS(Q) = ∅ and PASQ = ∅,
γ1(PASQ ) ∪Q otherwise.
PROPOSITION 5.2. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and γ1, γP be single-choice and maxichoice
selection functions, respectively, for P such that γ1(2P ) ∪ Q = γP ({R ∪ Q | R ∈ 2
P }).
Then P ∗ASγ1 Q = (P ∪Q)!γPQ.
5.2. Partial Meet Contraction
Having defined a revision operator, we now turn to the case of belief contraction. In
line with classic belief change, the contraction of a program P by a program Q should
eliminate from P all those beliefs from which Q can be derived. We use the comple-
ment of SE(Q), denoted by SE(Q), to determine all maximal subsets of P that do not
imply Q, called remainder sets.
DEFINITION 5.7 (REMAINDER SET). Let P,Q ∈ LPA. The set of remainder sets
of P with respect to Q is
P−Q = {R ⊆ P |SE(R) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ and, for all R
′,
R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P implies SE(R′) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ }.
DEFINITION 5.8 (PARTIAL MEET CONTRACTION). Let P ∈ LPA and γ be a selec-
tion function for P . A partial meet contraction operator .−γ for P is defined such that
for any Q ∈ LPA:
P .−γ Q =
{
P if |=s Q,⋂
γ(P−Q) otherwise.
The following example demonstrates the contraction operation.
EXAMPLE 5.4. Let P = { a., b ← a. } and Q = { a ← b. }. Since SE(Q) =
{(∅, b), (b, b), (b, ab)}, SE({ a. }) = {(a, a), (a, ab), (ab, ab)}, and SE({ b ← a. }) =
{(∅, ∅), (∅, b), (b, b), (∅, ab), (b, ab), (ab, ab)}, it follows that P−Q = { { b ← a. } } = γ(P
−
Q),
for any selection function γ, and thus we obtain P
.−γ Q = { b← a. }. 
The next theorem lists the translated AGM contraction postulates that are fulfilled
by .−γ .
THEOREM 5.3. The contraction operator .−γ satisfies (
.−1)–( .−4) and ( .−6).
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It is easy to see from Example 5.4 above that .−γ does indeed not satisfy (
.−5).
In the AGM framework, it is sufficient that the selection function γ is determined
by a transitive relation so that ⊖ satisfies (⊖7). Here, we require the relation ✂ to be
maximised as well to guarantee satisfaction of ( .−7). This is in line with the result for
partial meet base contractions, which also require the underlying selection function to
be determined by a maximised transitive relation in order to satisfy such a property
[Hansson 1993].
THEOREM 5.4. Let γ′ be determined by a maximised transitive relation. The con-
traction operator
.−γ′ satisfies (
.−7).
The following example demonstrates that .−γ′ does not satisfy (
.−8).
EXAMPLE 5.5. Consider again P and ✂ from Example 5.3. If SE(Q) = {A,B,E}
and SE(Q + R) = {E}, then SE(Q) = {C,D} and SE(Q+R) = {A,B,C,D}. We ob-
tain P−Q+R = {{r1, r2, r3}, {r1, r2, r4}, {r1, r5}} and P
−
Q = {{r1, r2}, {r1, r5}}. It follows
from γ′(P−Q+R) = {{r1, r2, r3}, {r1, r2, r4}} that
⋂
γ′(P−Q+R) = {r1, r2}, while γ
′(P−Q) =
{{r1, r5}} and thus
⋂
γ′(P−Q) = {r1, r5}. Therefore, P
.−γ′ (Q + R) = {r1, r2} * {r1, r5} =
P
.−γ′ Q. Note that SE(P
.−γ′ (Q +R)) = SE(
⋂
γ′(P−Q+R)) = {A,B,C,E} * {A,B,E} =
SE(Q). 
As in the case of our revision operator earlier, our partial meet contraction operator
does not properly align with the AGM framework, but the following representation
theorem holds for the contraction operator .−γ with respect to the belief base postu-
lates.
THEOREM 5.5. An operator .−γ is a partial meet contraction operator for P ∈ LPA
determined by a selection function γ for P iff
.−γ satisfies (
.−1b)–( .−4b).
Besides the representation theorem above via ( .−1b)–( .−4b), we have the following
additional properties of .−γ regarding the remaining belief base contraction postulates
( .−5b)–( .−8b).
PROPOSITION 5.3. The contraction operator .−γ satisfies (
.−5b), ( .−6b), and ( .−8b).
The next example illustrates that .−γ does not satisfy (
.−7b).
EXAMPLE 5.6. Let P = {r1, r2, r3, r4} with SE(r1) = {A,B,C,D,E}, SE(r2) =
{A,B,E}, SE(r3) = {A,C,E}, and SE(r4) = {C,D,E}. If SE(Q) = {A,D,E} and
SE(R) = {B,C,E}, then SE(Q) = {B,C}, SE(R) = {A,D}, and SE(Q+R) =
{A,B,C,D}. We thus have P−Q = {{r1, r2}, {r1, r3, r4}}, P
−
R = {{r1, r2, r3}, {r1, r4}}, and
P−Q+R = {{r1, r2, r3}, {r1, r3, r4}}. Let γ(P
−
Q) = P
−
Q, γ(P
−
R) = P
−
R, and γ(P
−
Q+R) = P
−
Q+R. It
then follows that
⋂
γ(P−Q) = {r1},
⋂
γ(P−R) = {r1}, and
⋂
γ(P−Q+R) = {r1, r3}. Therefore,
P
.−γ (Q +R) 6= P
.−γ Q = P
.−γ R = (P
.−γ Q) ∩ (P
.−γ R).
6. ENSCONCEMENT BELIEF CHANGE
In this section, we will introduce further belief revision and contraction operators for
logic programs, which are based on an ordering over the beliefs contained in a program.
We begin by defining an ensconcement relation for logic programs as follows.
DEFINITION 6.1 (ENSCONCEMENT). Let P ∈ LPA. An ensconcement associated
with P is any total preorder  on P that satisfies the following conditions:
(1) For any r ∈ P : SE({ r′ ∈ P \ {r} | r  r′ }) 6⊂ SE(r)
(2) For any r, r′ ∈ P : r  r′  r iff {r} ≡s {r′}
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Per this definition, an ensconcement associated with a logic program P is simply an
ordering over the rules occurring in P . With P representing our entire set of beliefs,
an ensconcement enables us to sort rules of P , which form our individual beliefs, hier-
archically by their epistemic importance, or in other words, by how willing we are to
give up one belief over another. Informally, r ≺ r′ means that the beliefs represented
by r′ are more important to us than the beliefs represented by r.
Condition (1) states that the set of SE models of any rule or combination of rules
at least as ensconced as a given rule r may not be a proper subset of the set of SE mod-
els of r. Condition (2) requires that strongly equivalent rules are equally ensconced.
Condition (1) is formulated slightly stronger than Condition (41) (see Section 2.2)
from the original definition [Williams 1994]. Condition (41) allows a sentence ψ, that
implies a sentence φ without being equivalent to φ, to be placed on the same enscon-
cement level as φ. In contrast, Condition (1) prohibits strict implication on the same
ensconcement level. For instance, given rules a., a ← b., and a; b. contained in some
program, both a ← b. and a; b. must be strictly more ensconced than a. according to
Condition (1), whereas in a direct adaptation of Condition (41) at least one of the
two rules a ← b. and a; b. would have to be equally ensconced as a.. The merit of this
additional restriction will become evident shortly, when we show some examples of
applying an ensconcement to perform revision operations in Section 6.1. The idea be-
hind Condition (42) of the original definition is that any tautologies must be most
ensconced, a requirement that is automatically captured in our Condition (1).
Using the concept of logic program ensconcements, we now go on to define logic
program revision and contraction operators and investigate their properties.
6.1. Ensconcement Revision
During a revision operation, new information from a program Q is added to an initial
belief state in the form of a program P , and some beliefs from P have to be given up to
achieve a consistent outcome. When the beliefs in P are ordered by an ensconcement,
we can introduce the notion of a cut to determine the specific level in the ensconcement
where all beliefs on and above this level are consistent with the revising program.
Since an ensconcement  associated with P is a relation over all rules of P , when we
write r  r′, we implicitly mean r ∈ P and r′ ∈ P .
DEFINITION 6.2 (CUT). Let P,Q ∈ LPA and  be an ensconcement associated
with P . The (proper) cut of P for Q, written cut(Q), is defined as
cut(Q) = { r ∈ P | SE ({ r
′ ∈ P | r  r′ }) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ } .
Some interesting properties of the cut are listed below.
LEMMA 6.1. Let P,Q,R ∈ LPA and  be an ensconcement associated with P .
a) If P +Q is satisfiable, then cut(Q) = P .
b) If Q is satisfiable, then cut(Q) +Q is satisfiable.
c) If Q is not satisfiable, then cut(Q) = ∅.
d) If Q |=s R, then cut(Q) ⊆ cut(R).
e) cut(Q+R) ⊆ cut(Q).
f) If cut(Q) |=s R, then cut(Q+R) = cut(Q).
A cut is the principal element for the following definition of an ensconcement revi-
sion operator.
DEFINITION 6.3 (ENSCONCEMENT REVISION). Let P ∈ LPA and  be an enscon-
cement associated with P . An ensconcement revision operator ∗ for P is defined such
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{ b← a. }
{ a← b. }
{ a. }
{ a← b. } { b← a. }
{ a. }
{ a← b. }
{ b← a. }
{ a. }
{ a← b. }
{ a. } { b← a. }
{ a← b. }
{ a. }
{ b← a. }
1 2 3 4 5
Fig. 1. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of Example 6.1
that for any Q ∈ LPA:
P ∗ Q =
{
P +Q if Q is not satisfiable,
{ r ∈ P | SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) } +Q otherwise.
The revision operator ∗ retains all elements of the cut. This is an obvious require-
ment since the cut contains our most firmly held beliefs which are entirely consistent
withQ. In addition, any rule of P not in the cut that shares the same SEmodels withQ
as the cut is retained as well. The example below illustrates the operation.
EXAMPLE 6.1. Let P = { a., a← b., b← a. } and Q = {⊥ ← b. }. Figure 1 shows all
possible ensconcements associated with P , with rules displayed at the top being more
ensconced than rules at the bottom. We have the following results:
1. cut1(Q) = { a← b., b← a. } and P ∗1 Q = { a← b., b← a., ⊥ ← b. }
2. cut2(Q) = { a← b., b← a. } and P ∗2 Q = { a← b., b← a., ⊥ ← b. }
3. cut3(Q) = { a← b., b← a. } and P ∗3 Q = { a← b., b← a., ⊥ ← b. }
4. cut4(Q) = { a← b. } and P ∗4 Q = { a← b., ⊥ ← b. }
5. cut5(Q) = { a← b., a. } and P ∗5 Q = { a← b., a., ⊥ ← b. } 
In Example 6.1, the belief expressed by the combination of rules { a. } and { b← a. } is
inconsistent with the new information {⊥ ← b. }. Thus, at least one of these two rules
must be discarded to reach a consistent belief state, while the rule { a ← b. } can be
safely retained. The example shows that the revision operator ∗ indeed retains { a←
b. } in all cases and discards one or both other rules depending on their ensconcement
level. Whenever { b ← a. } is more ensconced than { a. }, the latter is discarded and
vice versa. Only when both rules are equally ensconced, that is, when we cannot make
up our mind which the two beliefs we hold more firmly, the revision operator discards
both.
We can see from the definition of ∗ that the set of SE models of P ∗ Q is exactly
the set of SE models that are shared by cut(Q) and Q.
PROPOSITION 6.1. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and  be an ensconcement associated with P .
Then SE(P ∗ Q) = SE(cut(Q) +Q).
The next theorem states which of the adapted AGM revision postulates the revision
operator ∗ satisfies.
THEOREM 6.1. The revision operator ∗ satisfies (∗1)–(∗6) and (∗8).
The revision operator ∗ does not satisfy (∗7), as shown in the next example.
EXAMPLE 6.2. Let P = {r1, r2, r3}with SE(r1) = {B,C}, SE(r2) = {A,C}, SE(r3) =
{A,B,C}, and  be an ensconcement associated with P such that r1  r2  r1 ≺ r3.
If SE(Q) = {A,B} and SE(Q + R) = {A}, then cut(Q) = cut(Q + R) = {r3}, yet
(P ∗ Q) +R = {r3} ∪Q ∪R while P ∗ (Q +R) = {r2, r3} ∪Q ∪R. 
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Even though ensconcement revision was originally defined for belief bases, our en-
sconcement revision operator ∗ satisfies the majority of AGM revision postulates for
belief sets. Our operator does not satisfy any of the postulates that are unique to the
belief base framework, as stated in the next theorem.
THEOREM 6.2. The revision operator ∗ satisfies (∗1b), (∗2b), and (∗5b).
In the following two examples, we illustrate that ∗ does indeed not satisfy (∗3b)
and (∗4b), respectively.
EXAMPLE 6.3. Let SE = {A,B,C,D}, SE(Q) = {A,B}, and P = {r1, r2, r3} with
SE(r1) = {C,D}, SE(r2) = {B,C}, and SE(r3) = {A,B,C}. If  is an ensconcement
associated with P such that r1  r2  r1 ≺ r3, then cut(Q) = {r3} and P ∗ Q =
{r3}+Q. While r2 ∈ P\(P∗Q), there exists no program P
′ such that P∗Q ⊆ P
′ ⊆ P+Q
and P ′ is satisfiable but P ′ ∪ {r2} is not satisfiable. 
EXAMPLE 6.4. Let SE = {A,B,C,D}, SE(Q) = {A,B}, SE(R) = {A}, and P =
{r1, r2, r3} with SE(r1) = {C,D}, SE(r2) = {A,C}, and SE(r3) = {A,B,C}. If  is
an ensconcement associated with P such that r1  r2  r1 ≺ r3, then it holds for any
P ′ ⊆ P that P ′+Q is satisfiable iff P ′+R is satisfiable. However, we have cut(Q) = {r3}
and P ∩ (P ∗ Q) = {r3}, while cut(R) = {r3} and P ∩ (P ∗ R) = {r2, r3}. 
We will now examine the behaviour of our ensconcement revision operator with re-
spect to the set of five examples from Section 5.1. In each example, the revision outcome
is independent of the possible ensconcements that can be associated with P .
1) P ∗ Q = {⊥ ← a., b← a. }
SE(P ∗ Q) = {(∅, ∅), (∅, b), (b, b)}
2) P ∗ Q = { a., b← not a. }
SE(P ∗ Q) = {(a, a), (a, ab), (ab, ab)}
3) P ∗ Q = { a., b← a. }
SE(P ∗ Q) = {(ab, ab)}
4) P ∗ Q = {⊥ ← a., b← not a. }
SE(P ∗ Q) = {(b, b)}
5) P ∗ Q = { a., b← not c., ⊥ ← c. }
SE(P ∗ Q) = {(ab, ab)}
For all five examples, the ensconcement revision operator ∗ returns the same de-
sired results as the partial meet revision operator ∗γ . Examining in particular Exam-
ples 3) and 4), it now becomes evident why we diverted in our formulation of Condi-
tion (1) from the classic definition. Condition (1) prohibits strict implication on the
same ensconcement level. Without this refined requirement, for Example 3) we could
construct an ensconcement associated with P such that ⊥ ← a.  b ← a.  ⊥ ← a.,
which would give us the outcome P ∗ Q = { a. }. For Example 4), we could construct
an ensconcement associated with P such that a.  b ← not a.  a., which would lead
to the outcome P ∗Q = {⊥ ← a. }. These revision outcomes would correspond exactly
to the undesired results of the distance-based revision operator ⋆, which we set out to
avoid because they disrespect the preservation property.
6.2. Ensconcement Contraction
We now use the concept of an ensconcement to present another contraction operator
for logic programs. Analogous to revision, we first define for some P,Q ∈ LPA and an
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ensconcement  associated with P that
cut−(Q) = { r ∈ P | SE ({ r
′ ∈ P | r  r′ }) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ }.
Some useful properties of cut−(Q) are listed here.
LEMMA 6.2. Let P,Q,R ∈ LPA.
a) If P 6|=s Q, then cut
−
(Q) = P .
b) If 6|=s Q, then cut
−
(Q) 6|=s Q.
c) If |=s Q, then cut
−
(Q) = ∅.
d) If Q |=s R, then cut
−
(R) ⊆ cut
−
(Q).
e) cut−(Q) ⊆ cut
−
(Q+R).
f) If cut−(Q) |=s R, then cut
−
(Q+R) = cut
−
(Q).
g) If cut−(Q) 6|=s R, then cut
−
(Q+R) = cut
−
(R).
DEFINITION 6.4 (ENSCONCEMENT CONTRACTION). Let P ∈ LPA and  be an en-
sconcement associated with P . An ensconcement contraction operator .− for P is de-
fined such that for any Q ∈ LPA:
P .− Q =
{
P if |=s Q,
{ r ∈ P | SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) } otherwise.
The contraction operator .− works in a dual way to the revision operator ∗. It re-
lies on cut−(Q) to determine from which level upward in the ensconcement associated
with P elements are retained in the operation, and adds any further parts of P that do
not compromise the set of SE models of cut−(Q) inconsistent with Q.
We can formalise the relationship between the SE models of P .− Q and cut
−
(Q) as
follows.
PROPOSITION 6.2. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and  be an ensconcement associated with P .
Then SE(P .− Q) ∩ SE(Q) = SE(cut
−
(Q)) ∩ SE(Q).
The contraction operator .− satisfies all AGM contraction postulates except Recov-
ery.
THEOREM 6.3. The contraction operator .− satisfies (
.−1)–( .−4) and ( .−6)–( .−8).
The next example shows why .− does not satisfy the Recovery postulate (
.−5).
EXAMPLE 6.5. Consider again P and Q from Example 5.4. For any ensconcement 
associated with P , it holds that P
.− Q = { b ← a. }. Thus, P = { a., b ← a. } * { b ←
a., a← b. } = (P .− Q) +Q. 
The main reason for non-satisfaction of Recovery is that our ensconcement contrac-
tion operator .− operates on programs that are not logically closed, and Recovery is
a key AGM postulate that characterises contractions of logically closed belief sets. On
the other hand, our ensconcement contraction operator satisfies the same set of belief
base postulates as its classic counterpart.
THEOREM 6.4. The contraction operator .− satisfies (−1b), (−2b) and (−5b)–(−8b).
The following two examples demonstrate that the contraction operator .− does not
satisfy ( .−3b) and ( .−4b), respectively.
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{ c. }
{ a. } { b. }
Fig. 2.  of Example 7.1
EXAMPLE 6.6. Let SE = {A,B,C,D}, SE(Q) = {C}, and consider again P and 
from Example 6.3. Then cut−(Q) = {r3} = P
.−Q. While r2 ∈ P \ (P
.−Q), there exists
no program P ′ such that P .− Q ⊆ P ′ ⊆ P and P ′ 6|=s Q but P ′ ∪ {r2} |=s Q. 
EXAMPLE 6.7. Let SE = {A,B,C,D}, SE(Q) = {C}, SE(R) = {B,C}, and consider
again P and  from Example 6.4. Then it holds for any P ′ ⊆ P that P ′ 6|=s Q iff
P ′ 6|=s R. However, we have cut
−
(Q) = {r3} and P
.− Q = {r3}, while cut
−
(R) = {r3}
and P
.− R = {r2, r3}. 
7. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE OPERATORS
Having defined partial meet revision and contraction operators and ensconcement re-
vision and contraction operators in the previous sections, we now establish the for-
mal connections between them. We first relate partial meet revision to ensconcement
revision and partial meet contraction to ensconcement contraction. We then investi-
gate whether the granularity of ensconcements, that is, whether an ensconcement is
defined over rules or subsets of a program, influences that relationship. Finally, we
connect partial meet revision to partial meet contraction and ensconcement revision
to ensconcement contraction via the Levi and Harper identities.
7.1. Relating Partial Meet Operators to Ensconcement Operators
We already saw from the set of postulates that ∗ and ∗γ satisfy, that partial meet
revision and ensconcement revision share similar properties. In the following charac-
terisation theorem we state the exact relationship between the two.
THEOREM 7.1. Let P,Q ∈ LPA. For any selection function γ, there exists an enscon-
cement  associated with P such that P ∗γ Q = P ∗ Q.
Theorem 7.1 asserts that ∗γ can be characterised in terms of ∗. The other direction
is not possible, as shown in the example below.
EXAMPLE 7.1. Let P = { a., b., c. }, Q = {⊥ ← a. }, and  be the ensconcement
associated with P as shown in Figure 2. It follows that cut(Q) = { c. } and P ∗ Q =
{ c., ⊥ ← a. }. Yet PQ = { { b., c. } } = γ(PQ), for any selection function γ, so that P ∗γQ =
{ b., c., ⊥ ← a. }. We have P ∗ Q 6= P ∗γ Q. 
On the one hand, the requirement SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(R) in Definition 6.3
requires any subset R of P that is not part of the cut to have all SE models shared
by the cut and Q, in order to be included in the revision outcome. In the previous
example, the SE models shared by the cut and Q are (c, c), (c, bc), and (bc, bc). Since
(c, c) 6∈ SE({ b. }) (and also (c, bc) 6∈ SE({ b. })), it follows that { b. } * P ∗ Q. On the
other hand, the definition of partial meet revision is based on compatible sets, which
are required to be maximal and to share only a minimum of one SE model with Q
(Definition 5.1). This requirement limits the result of a partial meet revision for this
example to the one above, regardless of the the type of selection function employed.
We also find that the partial meet contraction operator .−γ can be characterised in
terms of the ensconcement contraction operator .−, formalised in the next theorem.
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THEOREM 7.2. Let P,Q ∈ LPA. For any selection function γ, there exists an enscon-
cement  associated with P such that P .−γ Q = P
.− Q.
The other direction of this theorem does not hold. Consider again P and  from
Example 7.1 and let Q = { a. }. It is easy to see that P .−γ Q 6= P
.−Q, for any selection
function γ.
7.2. Granularity of Ensconcements
For our partial meet construction, we determined the outcome of a revision or con-
traction operation by employing a function that selects among subsets of a program.
For our ensconcement construction, we then used an ordering over individual rules
of a program to select the rules to retain during a revision or contraction operation.
Given the Characterisation Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 that hold only in one direction, it
is worth investigating whether this difference in granularity, subsets or rules, plays
a critical role in determining revision or contraction outcomes. To do so, we will now
consider program subsets as the objects of change for our ensconcement revision and
contraction operators. We begin with the definition of an ensconcement over subsets of
a program.
DEFINITION 7.1 (ENSCONCEMENT OVER SUBSETS). Given P ∈ LPA, a subset-
ensconcement associated with P is any total preorder R on 2P that satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions:
(R1) For any R ⊆ P : SE({R′ ⊆ P \R | R  R′ }) 6⊂ SE(R)
(R2) For any R,R′ ⊆ P : R  R′  R iff R ≡s R′
We define revision and contraction operators based on R as follows.
DEFINITION 7.2 (SUBSET-ENSCONCEMENT REVISION). Let P ∈ LPA andR be a
subset-ensconcement associated with P . A subset-ensconcement revision operator ∗R
for P is defined such that for any Q ∈ LPA:
P ∗R Q =
{
P +Q if Q is not satisfiable,
{R ⊆ P | SE(cutR(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(R) }+Q otherwise,
where cutR(Q) = {R ⊆ P | SE ({R
′ ⊆ P | R  R′ }) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ }.
DEFINITION 7.3 (SUBSET-ENSCONCEMENT CONTRACTION). Let P ∈ LPA and
R be a subset-ensconcement associated with P . A subset-ensconcement contraction
operator .−R for P is defined such that for any Q ∈ LPA:
P
.−R Q =
{
P if |=s Q,
{R ⊆ P | SE(cut−
R
(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(R) } otherwise,
where cut−R(Q) = {R ⊆ P | SE ({R
′ ⊆ P | R  R′ }) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ }.
It turns out that it does not matter whether an ensconcement over subsets of a pro-
gram or only over the individual rules is used to determine a revision or contraction
outcome, provided that the individual rules are ordered in the same way in both en-
sconcements, as stated in the following theorem.
THEOREM 7.3. Let P,Q ∈ LPA,  be an ensconcement associated with P , and R a
subset-ensconcement associated with P such that {r} R {r′} iff r  r′ for all r, r′ ∈ P .
Then P ∗ Q = P ∗R Q (or P
.− Q = P
.−R Q, alternatively).
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7.3. Relating Revision Operators to Contraction Operators
We now formalise the connection between partial meet revision and partial meet con-
traction with the help of the Levi and Harper identities as given in Definition 4.1.
PROPOSITION 7.1. Let P ∈ LPA, γ be a selection function for P , and ∗ an operator
for P such that for any Q ∈ LPA: P ∗Q = (P
.−γ Q) +Q. Then P ∗Q = P ∗γ Q.
PROPOSITION 7.2. Let P ∈ LPA, γ be a selection function for P , and
.− an operator
for P such that for any Q ∈ LPA: P
.−Q = P ∩ (P ∗γ Q). Then P
.−Q = P .−γ Q.
The characterisation via Levi and Harper identities also holds for ensconcement
revision and ensconcement contraction.
PROPOSITION 7.3. Let P ∈ LPA,  be an ensconcement associated with P , and ∗
an operator for P such that for anyQ ∈ LPA: P ∗Q = (P
.−Q)+Q. Then P ∗Q = P ∗Q.
PROPOSITION 7.4. Let P ∈ LPA,  be an ensconcement associated with P , and
.−
an operator for P such that for anyQ ∈ LPA: P
.−Q = P∩(P ∗Q). Then P
.−Q = P .−Q.
8. LOCALISED BELIEF CHANGE
In Sections 5 and 6, we introduced two new sets of belief change operators for logic
programs. While the definitions of our operators are based on classic declarative con-
structions, such formulations may not be optimal for practical implementations. In
particular, the formation of a set of compatible sets to conduct a partial meet revision
or contraction requires that all possible combinations of all rules in a program are
evaluated with respect to their sets of SE models. When dealing with logic programs
that contain a large number of rules, where only a small number of them are actually
affected by the change operation, this procedure entails unreasonable costs. In this
section, we present an algorithm to minimise these costs. We begin by identifying the
subsets of a program, called modules, relevant to another program.
DEFINITION 8.1 (MODULE). Let P ∈ LPA and a ∈ A. For any rule r ∈ P with
a ∈ At(r), we recursively constructM(P )ri |a as
{r} ∪ { r′ ∈ P | At(r′) ∩
(
At(r) ∪At(M(P )ri−1|a)
)
\ {a} 6= ∅ }
for i > 0 andM(P )r0|a = ∅.
Since P is finite and M(P )ri |a is monotonic with respect to i, the sequence⋃∞
i=0M(P )
r
i |a will reach a fixpoint. We denote the fixpoint by M(P )
r|a and call it the
module of P related to r including a (or the r-module including a, if P is clear from the
context).
EXAMPLE 8.1. Let r1: a., r2: b← a., r3: c← not b., and P = {r1, r2, r3}. The modules
that can be constructed from P are: M(P )r1 |a = {r1},M(P )r2 |a = {r2, r3},M(P )r2|b =
{r1, r2},M(P )r3|b = {r3}, andM(P )r3 |c = {r1, r2, r3}. 
Starting with a given atom a and a given rule r from P , the recursive definition first
finds all rules in P that share atoms with r except for a. Then it finds all rules in P that
share atoms with r or any of the rules found in the first step except for a, and so on.
It does not matter whether atoms appear in the head or the body of a rule, or whether
they occur with or without default negation. The resulting module is the collection of
rules in P that are related to r through shared atoms. The reason for excluding a will
become clear after the following definition of a set of relevant modules.
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 00, Publication date: March 2000.
Syntax-Preserving Belief Change Operators for Logic Programs 00:29
DEFINITION 8.2 (RELEVANT MODULE). Let P ∈ LPA. Given an atom a ∈ A, we
define the set of all modules of P including a as:
M(P )|a = {M(P )
r|a | r ∈ P and a ∈ At(r) }.
Given Q ∈ LPA, we define the set of all modules of P relevant to Q as:
M(P )|Q = {M(P )
r|a | r ∈ P and a ∈ At(r) ∩ At(Q) }.
Essentially, the definition of a set of modules extracts those rules from a program
that may be affected during a revision or contraction by another program. It thus aims
for the same goal as the language-splitting technique in propositional logic [Parikh
1999], which splits a knowledge base into several partitions either relevant or irrele-
vant to a belief change. However, a distinct feature in the previous definitions is the
construction of a module based on each rule in which a certain atom occurs. This fea-
ture allows us to get a closer look at which rules may conflict with some given informa-
tion. Consider the program { a ← b., ⊥ ← b. }. If we were to add the information that
“b holds” to this program, it would conflict with the latter rule but not with the first
one. By creating a module for each occurrence of b, we split the program into two mod-
ules (one for each rule) and can assess the compatibility of each module with the new
information separately. This also separates our approach from the method to compute
compartments [Hansson and Wassermann 2002; Wassermann 2000]. That method as-
sumes a graph representation of a belief base, where each sentence of the belief base is
a node and edges connect sentences that share at least one atom. The parts of a belief
base relevant to a given sentence φ for a change operation are the sentences that can
be reached from φ. Thus, it does not distinguish between occurrences of φ as in our
method. Furthermore, our method constructs modules for each individual atom occur-
ring in Q and thus ensures that we are dealing with minimal units of P in a change
operation. Obviously, a module may not be unique to a certain rule or a certain given
atom so that modules may overlap or coincide.
We say that a set of rules R conflicts with some program Q if SE(R)∩SE(Q) = ∅. All
rules of P that conflict with Q are included in some module or combination of modules
fromM(P )|Q.
PROPOSITION 8.1. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and SE(P ) 6= ∅ 6= SE(Q). For any R ⊆ P , if
SE(R) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ and for all R′ ⊂ R it holds that SE(R′) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅, then there
existsM ∈ 2M(P )|Q such that R ⊆
⋃
M.
COROLLARY 8.1. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and SE(P ) 6= ∅. Then SE(P ) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ if and
only if SE (
⋃
M(P )|Q) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅.
We are now ready to introduce an optimisation algorithm for logic program revi-
sion and contraction based on modules. Algorithm 1 resolves potential conflicts for all
possible combinations of modules by applying revision or contraction on a modular
level. It performs a bottom-up construction by first taking all 1-combinations (single-
ton sets of modules) ofM and substituting a module with its changed version if they
are not the same. It then takes all 2-combinations ofM, which may now contain some
changed modules, and replaces each module of the combination with the changed ver-
sion of the combination if required. Replacing each module of a combination with the
outcome guarantees that the algorithm considers all possible combinations. The algo-
rithm terminates after handling the combination of all modules in M. The algorithm
performs |M||M|/2 operations in the worst case, so its complexity is exponential. Since
the formation of PQ or P
−
Q requires |2
P ||2
P |/2 operations in the worst case, the algorithm
performs better whenever |M| is less than |2P |.
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ALGORITHM 1: MODCHANGE
Input: a setM of modules, an operator ◦, a program Q
Output: the setM of changed modules
n← 1;
while n ≤ |M| do
foreachM ⊆M such that |M| = n do
if ◦ is a revision operator and SE(
⋃
M) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ then
foreach M ∈M do
replace M with (
⋃
M ◦Q) \Q inM;
end
else if ◦ is a contraction operator and SE(
⋃
M) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ then
foreach M ∈M do
replace M with
⋃
M ◦Q inM;
end
end
n← n+ 1;
end
return M;
The next theorem states that the algorithm MODCHANGE reduces a partial meet
revision or contraction operation on a logic program to the revision or contraction op-
eration on the relevant subsets of that program, given a suitable selection function γ.
In the following, let P \M(P )|Q = { r ∈ P | for allM ∈ M(P )|Q : r 6∈ M } andM(P )|◦Q
denote the output of Algorithm 1 for the inputsM(P )|Q, ◦ ∈ {∗γ ,
.−γ , ∗,
.−}, and Q.
THEOREM 8.1. For any P,Q ∈ LPA, there exists a selection function γ for P such
that P ∗γ Q = P \M(P )|Q +
⋃
M(P )|
∗γ
Q + Q (or P
.−γ Q = P \M(P )|Q +
⋃
M(P )|
.−γ
Q ,
respectively).
The reason why Theorem 8.1 does not hold for any arbitrary selection function is
that during the operation of MODCHANGE a selection function chooses from subsets
of modules, while it chooses from subsets of a program during the operation of ∗γ
per Definition 5.4 ( .−γ per Definition 5.8, respectively). Consequently, the result of the
former operation may not in all cases correspond to the result of the latter operation.
We have already established in Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 that ∗γ and
.−γ can be char-
acterised in terms of ∗ and
.−, respectively. Therefore, we can directly extend Theo-
rem 8.1 to ensconcement revision and contraction.
COROLLARY 8.2. For any P,Q ∈ LPA, there exists an ensconcement  associated
with P such that P ∗ Q = P \M(P )|Q +
⋃
M(P )|
∗
Q +Q (or P
.− Q = P \M(P )|Q +⋃
M(P )|
.−
Q , respectively).
9. DISCUSSION
From our investigations in the previous sections, we can extract two main findings.
Firstly, the belief change operators for logic programs that we proposed here are able
to address the unintuitive behaviour of the distance-based approach. The latter takes
a holistic, program-level view on logic programs and their revisions, by assuming a
belief state to be the set of SE models of the entire program. Due to its focus on the
program-level, the distance-based approach neglects information about relationships
between atoms that is only captured on the rule-level, by the individual rules of a
program, and therefore violates the properties of preservation and support.
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Table I. AGM revision postulates satisfied by ∗γ′ and ∗
(∗1) (∗2) (∗3) (∗4) (∗5) (∗6) (∗7) (∗8)
∗γ′ X X X X X X
∗ X X X X X X X
Table II. AGM contraction postulates satisfied by
.
−γ′ and
.
−
( .−1) ( .−2) ( .−3) ( .−4) ( .−5) ( .−6) ( .−7) ( .−8)
.
−γ′ X X X X X X
.
− X X X X X X X
Table III. Base revision postulates satisfied by ∗γ
and ∗
(∗1b) (∗2b) (∗3b) (∗4b) (∗5b)
∗γ X X X X X
∗ X X X
Table IV. Base contraction postulates satisfied by
.
−γ and
.
−
( .−1b) ( .−2b) ( .−3b) ( .−4b) ( .−5b) ( .−6b) ( .−7b) ( .−8b)
.
−γ X X X X X X X
.
− X X X X X X
For our approach, we adapted partial meet and ensconcement constructions, which
allowed us to define operators that are more sensitive with respect to the information
expressed by the individual rules of a program. In particular, we considered the rules
of a program in their syntactic form as a belief state and thus as the objects of change,
which made it possible to preserve necessary information on the syntactic level during
a change operation. This characteristic turned out to be key for satisfying the preser-
vation and support properties. It should be noted, however, that our operators are still
model-based and not purely syntactic operators. Our operators rely on satisfaction de-
fined under SE model semantics to determine compatible sets, remainder sets, enscon-
cements, and cuts, not on syntactic transformations of program components. Rather,
our operators bridge the gap between purely semantic and purely syntactic methods,
which is why we call them syntax-preserving.
Secondly, we found that our operators fit properly into the belief base framework
for belief change. Tables I, II, III, and IV provide an overview of the postulates that
are satisfied by each operator. Our partial meet revision operator ∗γ satisfies all basic
AGM revision postulates (∗1)–(∗6). However, the partial meet revision operator does
not satisfy the supplementary postulates (∗7)–(∗8), even with further restrictions on
the selection function, which allow operators under propositional logic to satisfy the
supplementary postulates. A similar situation exists for our partial meet contraction
operator .−γ . The partial meet contraction operator satisfies all basic postulates (
.−1)–
( .−6) with the exception of the controversial Recovery postulate ( .−5). It satisfies ( .−7)
but not ( .−8) of the supplementary postulates when the selection function is restricted
to be determined by a maximised transitive relation.
On the other hand, evaluating our partial meet revision and contraction operators
with respect to the belief base postulates showed that they exhibit the same charac-
teristics as the partial meet base revision and contraction operators for propositional
logic [Hansson 1993]. The partial meet revision operator is represented by (∗1b)–(∗5b)
(Theorem 5.2) and the partial meet contraction operator by ( .−1b)–( .−4b) (Theorem 5.5),
and thus both operators fit neatly into the belief base framework.
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Table V. AGM revision postulates satisfied by ⋆
(∗1) (∗2) (∗3) (∗4) (∗5) (∗6) (∗7) (∗8)
⋆ X X X
Table VI. Base revision postulates satisfied by ⋆
(∗1b) (∗2b) (∗3b) (∗4b) (∗5b)
⋆ X
Our ensconcement revision operator .− satisfies the same basic AGM postulates
(∗1)–(∗6) as our partial meet revision operator and in addition (∗8), but also disre-
spects (∗7). Our ensconcement contraction operator .− satisfies all AGM postulates
( .−1)–( .−8) with the exception of ( .−5). Since an ensconcement-based construction is
essentially geared towards belief bases [Williams 1994], our ensconcement operators
should align well with the belief base framework. Indeed, our ensconcement contrac-
tion operator .− satisfies the same set of belief base postulates as its counterpart
for propositional logic [Ferme´ et al. 2008], that is, ( .−1b), ( .−2b), and ( .−5b)–( .−8b). As
the classic belief base revision postulates (>1)–(>5) have originally been proposed to
characterise partial meet base revision operations, their applicability to characterise
ensconcement revision operations is limited. It would be interesting for future work to
define a set of belief base revision postulates that can exactly characterise ensconce-
ment revision operations. Until then, we can use our adaptation of the Harper identity
to show that any ensconcement contraction operator determined by our ensconcement
revision operator ∗ satisfies (
.−1b), ( .−2b), and ( .−5b)–( .−8b).
It is now left to examine how our operators compare to the distance-based operator
in terms of the AGM and belief base postulates. Tables V and VI display the postu-
lates satisfied by the distance-based operator ⋆. We can see that both our partial meet
revision operator ∗γ and our ensconcement revision operator ∗ are better-behaved
than ⋆ on the scale of AGM postulates as well as on the scale of belief base postulates.
It should be noted, however, that ⋆ satisfies (∗4m), which has a stricter antecedent
than (∗6), but neither ∗γ nor ∗ satisfies (∗4m).
10. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented two new constructions of belief change in logic programs.
Our specific aim was to overcome the drawbacks of existing semantic revision opera-
tors, namely, that they do not satisfy the properties of preservation and support. These
are fundamental properties for a logic program belief change operator to return in-
tuitive results. For this purpose, we chose to adapt partial meet and ensconcement
constructions from classic belief change, which allowed us to define syntax-preserving
belief change operators for logic programs that satisfy preservation and support.
Our approach is novel in that the partial meet and ensconcement constructions not
only enabled our operators to preserve more information from a logic program during
a change operation than purely semantic operators, but they also facilitated natural
definitions of contraction operators for logic programs, the first in the field to the best
of our knowledge.
In order to evaluate the rationality of our operators, we translated the revision and
contraction postulates from the classic AGM and belief base frameworks to logic pro-
grams. We established that our operators fit properly within the belief base frame-
work and showed their interdefinability. We also demonstrated that our operators
align more closely to the AGM and belief base frameworks than the distance-based
revision operators and that they generalise the screened semi-revision operator. We
further presented an algorithm to optimise our revision and contraction operations.
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In future work, we aim to develop and implement an algorithm for constructing the
relevant modules of a program.
While our partial meet and ensconcement operators specify how a program changes
during a revision or contraction operation, they do not specify how the associated selec-
tion function or ensconcement relation changes. A selection function or ensconcement
is associated with a program before the change operation. During the change opera-
tion, some rules may be discarded from the program and some new rules may be added
to it in the case of revision, and any effects on the initial selection function or enscon-
cement or entrenchment should be taken into consideration. Such an extension to our
approach would be worthwhile to pursue in the future.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
PROPOSITION 4.1: Let .− be a contraction operator on LPA. If
.− satisfies ( .−3b), then
it satisfies ( .−8b).
PROOF. Proof by contrapositive: Let r ∈ P \ (P .−Q). Assume SE(P .−Q) ⊆ SE(Q)∪
SE(r). Then for all P ′ such that P .− Q ⊆ P ′ ⊆ P with SE(P ′) * SE(Q): SE(P ′) ∩
SE(r) * SE(Q), due to the assumption and due to SE(P ′) ⊆ SE(P .−Q).
THEOREM 5.1: The revision operator ∗γ satisfies (∗1)–(∗6).
PROOF.
(∗1): Follows directly from Definition 5.4.
(∗2): Follows directly from Definition 5.4.
(∗3): If Q is not satisfiable, then P ∗γQ = P +Q. Otherwise, since
⋂
γ(PQ) ⊆ P we have⋂
γ(PQ) +Q ⊆ P +Q.
(∗4): If P + Q is satisfiable, then PQ = {P} = γ(PQ), for any selection function γ, and
thus P ∗γ Q = P +Q.
(∗5): If Q is not satisfiable, then P ∗γ Q = P + Q is not satisfiable. If Q is satisfiable,
then for any R ∈ PQ, R+Q is satisfiable, which implies P ∗γ Q is satisfiable.
(∗6): Follows directly from Definition 5.4.
LEMMA A.1. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and γ be a selection function for P . If r ∈ P ∩Q, then
r ∈
⋂
γ(PQ).
PROOF. Let P,Q ∈ LPA. Assume there exists r ∈ (P ∩ Q) \ (
⋂
γ(PQ)). Then there
existsR ∈ γ(PQ) : r 6∈ R. It follows that SE(R∪{r})∩SE(Q) 6= ∅ since SE(R)∩SE(Q) 6=
∅ by Definition 5.1 and r ∈ Q implies SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r). This is a contradiction because
R is maximal by Definition 5.1.
THEOREM 5.2: An operator ∗γ is a partial meet revision operator for P ∈ LPA de-
termined by a selection function γ for P iff ∗γ satisfies (∗1b)–(∗5b).
PROOF. We first show that a partial meet revision operator ∗γ for P determined by
a given selection function γ for P satisfies (∗1b)–(∗5b).
(∗1b): Since (∗1b) = (∗2) and ∗γ satisfies (∗2), ∗γ also satisfies (∗1b).
(∗2b): Since (∗2b) = (∗3) and ∗γ satisfies (∗3), ∗γ also satisfies (∗2b).
(∗3b): Let r ∈ P . Assume that for all P ′ with P ∗γ Q ⊆ P ′ ⊂ P + Q and P ′ being
satisfiable, it holds that P ′ ∪ {r} is satisfiable. In particular, for each R ∈ PQ with
P ∗γ Q ⊆ R ∪ Q, this implies R ∪ Q ∪ {r} is satisfiable. As each R is subset-maximal,
it follows that r ∈ R and thus r ∈
⋂
γ(PQ). From Definition 5.4 we can then conclude
r 6∈ P \ (P ∗γ Q).
(∗4b): For all P ′ ⊆ P , let P ′ + Q be satisfiable iff P ′ + R is satisfiable. Then PQ = PR
by Definition 5.1 and so
⋂
γ(PQ) =
⋂
γ(PR) as well as P ∩
⋂
γ(PQ) = P ∩
⋂
γ(PR). By
Lemma A.1 we obtain (P ∩
⋂
γ(PQ)) ∪ (P ∩ Q) = (P ∩
⋂
γ(PR)) ∪ (P ∩ R). This means
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 00, Publication date: March 2000.
00:34 S. Binnewies et al.
P ∩ (
⋂
γ(PQ) ∪Q) = P ∩ (
⋂
γ(PR) ∪R). Thus, P ∩ (P ∗γ Q) = P ∩ (P ∗γ R).
(∗5b): If Q is satisfiable, then for any R ∈ PQ, R+Q is satisfiable, which implies P ∗γ Q
is satisfiable.
We now show that any operator ◦γ for P satisfying (∗1b)–(∗5b) is a partial meet
revision operator for P determined by some selection function for P . We first find a
selection function γ for P . Let γ be such that (i) if PQ = ∅, then γ(PQ) = ∅ and (ii)
γ(PQ) = {R ∈ PQ | P ∩ (P ◦γ Q) ⊆ R } otherwise.
We begin by showing that γ is a function. If PQ = PR, then P ∩(P ◦γQ) = P ∩(P ◦γR)
by (∗4b). This means γ(PQ) = γ(PR) according to our definition of γ.
We next show that γ is a selection function. Clearly, γ(PQ) ⊆ PQ by our definition of
γ. If PQ 6= ∅, thenQ is satisfiable by Definition 5.1 and thus P ◦γQ is satisfiable by (∗5b).
Since Q ⊆ P ◦γQ by (∗1b) and P ◦γ Q ⊆ P ∪Q by (∗2b), it follows that (P ∩ (P ◦γQ))∪Q
is satisfiable. This means that there exists R ∈ PQ such that P ∩ (P ◦γ Q) ⊆ R. From
our definition of γ we therefore obtain that γ(PQ) 6= ∅.
Finally, we show that ◦γ is a partial meet revision operator for P , that is, P ◦γ Q =
P ∪ Q if Q is not satisfiable and P ◦γ Q =
⋂
γ(PQ) ∪ Q otherwise. Consider first the
limiting case that Q is not satisfiable. If r ∈ P \ (P ◦γ Q), then there exists P ′ such that
P ◦γ Q ⊆ P ′ ⊂ P ∪Q and P ′ is satisfiable but P ′ ∪ {r} is not satisfiable by (∗3b). This is
a contradiction since Q ⊆ P ′ by (∗1b). Therefore, it holds for all r ∈ P that r ∈ P ◦γ Q,
that is, P ⊆ P ◦γ Q. Since Q ⊆ P ◦γ Q by (∗1b) and P ◦γ Q ⊆ P ∪ Q by (∗2b), we can
conclude P ◦γ Q = P ∪Q.
Assume now that Q is satisfiable. Let r ∈ P \ (P ◦γ Q). If PQ = ∅, then it follows from
(∗1b) and (∗3b) that P ◦γ Q = Q. Since γ(PQ) = ∅ by our definition of γ, we thus have
P ◦γ Q = Q =
⋂
γ(PQ) ∪ Q. If PQ 6= ∅, then it follows directly from our definition of γ
that P ∩ (P ◦γQ) ⊆
⋂
γ(PQ). From (∗1b) and (∗2b) we then obtain P ◦γQ ⊆
⋂
γ(PQ)∪Q.
To show the converse inclusion, first assume the case that P ∪ Q is satisfiable. This
implies that for any P ′ ⊆ P ∪Q it holds that P ′ is satisfiable. Applying (∗3b), we obtain
P \(P ◦γQ) = ∅ and thus P ⊆ P ◦γQ. From (∗1b) and (∗2b) it follows that P ◦γQ = P ∪Q.
Moreover, due to the assumption that P ∪ Q is satisfiable and Definition 5.1, we have
PQ = {P}. By our definition of γ, we obtain γ(PQ) = {P} and thus
⋂
γ(PQ) = P and
can conclude P ◦γQ =
⋂
γ(PQ)∪Q. Lastly, assume the case that P ∪Q is not satisfiable.
We will show that r 6∈ P ◦γ Q implies r 6∈
⋂
γ(PQ) ∪ Q. If r 6∈ P , then r 6∈ (P ◦γ Q) \ Q
by (∗1b) and (∗2b) and r 6∈
⋂
γ(PQ) by Definition 5.1. Since r 6∈ P ◦γ Q implies r 6∈ Q by
(∗1b), it follows that r 6∈ ((P ◦γ Q) \Q)∪Q) = P ◦γ Q and r ∈
⋂
γ(PQ)∪Q. Now assume
r ∈ P \ (P ◦γ Q). According to (∗3b), then there exists P ′ such that P ◦γ Q ⊆ P ′ ⊂ P ∪Q
and P ′ is satisfiable but P ′∪{r} is not satisfiable. This means that there exists R ∈ PQ
such that P ∩ P ′ ⊆ R and r 6∈ R. Since P ∩ (P ◦γ Q) ⊆ P ∩ P ′ ⊆ R, we obtain from our
definition of γ that R ∈ γ(PQ). We can thus conclude from r 6∈ R that r 6∈
⋂
γ(PQ).
PROPOSITION 5.1: Let P,Q ∈ LPA. For any maxichoice selection function γP for P ,
there exists a selection function γ for P such that (P ∪Q)!SEγP Q = P ∗γ Q.
PROOF. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and γP be a maxichoice selection function for P . We will
prove by cases.
Case 1: Q is not satisfiable. This means (P ∪ Q)⊥SE! Q = ∅ by definition of P⊥
SE
! Q.
Then γP ((P ∪ Q)⊥SE! Q) = P ∪ Q by definition of γP . It follows that (P ∪ Q)!
SE
γP Q =
P ∪Q = P ∗γ Q by definition of !SEγP and Definition 5.4.
Case 2: Q is satisfiable and for all R ⊆ P : SE(R ∪ Q) = ∅. Then (P ∪ Q)⊥SE! Q =
{Q} by definition of ⊥SE! and PQ = ∅ =
⋂
γ(PQ) by Definition 5.1. It follows that
(P ∪Q)!SEγP Q = γP ((P ∪Q)⊥
SE
! Q) = Q = P ∗γ Q by definition of !
SE
γP and Definition 5.4.
Case 3: Q is satisfiable and there exists R ⊆ P : SE(R ∪ Q) 6= ∅ such that for all
R′ with R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P : SE(R′) = ∅. Then R ∪ Q ∈ (P ∪ Q)⊥SE! Q by definition of ⊥
SE
!
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and R ∈ PQ by Definition 5.1. Let γ be a maxichoice selection function for P such that
γ(2P ) ∪ Q = γP ({R ∪ Q | R ∈ 2P }). This implies γP ((P ∪ Q)⊥SE! Q) = γ(PQ) ∪ Q =⋂
γ(PQ) ∪Q. Thus, (P ∪Q)!SEγP Q = P ∗γ Q by definition of !
SE
γP and Definition 5.4.
PROPOSITION 5.2: Let P,Q ∈ LPA and γ
1, γP be single-choice and maxichoice se-
lection functions, respectively, for P . If γ1(2P ) ∪Q = γP ({R ∪Q | R ∈ 2P }) for any γP ,
then P ∗ASγ1 Q = (P ∪Q)!γPQ.
PROOF. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and γ
1, γP be single-choice and maxichoice selection func-
tions, respectively, for P . Assume that γ1(2P ) ∪ Q = γP ({R ∪ Q | R ∈ 2P }) for any γP .
We will prove by cases.
Case 1: AS(Q) = ∅ and for all R ⊆ P : AS(R ∪ Q) = ∅. This implies PASQ = ∅ by
definition of PASQ and thus P ∗γQ = P ∪Q by Definition 5.6. It also implies (P ∪Q)⊥!Q =
∅ by definition of P⊥!Q and therefore γP ((P ∪ Q)⊥!Q) = P ∪Q by definition of γP . We
can conclude (P ∪Q)!γPQ = P ∪Q by Definition 3.2.
Case 2: AS(Q) 6= ∅ and for all R ⊆ P : AS(R ∪ Q) = ∅. Then PASQ = ∅ = γ
1(PASQ )
by definitions of PASQ and γ
1. We also have (P ∪ Q)⊥!Q = {Q} = γP ((P ∪ Q)⊥!Q) by
definitions of ⊥! and γP . It follows that P ∗ASγ1 Q = Q = (P ∪ Q)!γPQ by Definitions 5.6
and 3.2.
Case 3: There exists R ⊆ P : AS(R ∪ Q) 6= ∅ and for all R′ with R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P :
AS(R′ ∪ Q) = ∅. Then R ∈ PASQ by definition of P
AS
Q and R ∪ Q ∈ (P ∪ Q)⊥!Q by
definition of ⊥!. Due to the assumption, it holds that γ1(PASQ ) ∪ Q = γP ((P ∪ Q)⊥!Q).
Thus, P ∗ASγ1 Q = (P ∪Q)!γPQ by Definitions 5.6 and 3.2.
THEOREM 5.3: The contraction operator .−γ satisfies (
.−1)–( .−4) and ( .−6).
PROOF.
( .−1): Follows directly from Definition 5.8.
( .−2): Follows directly from Definition 5.8.
( .−3): If P 6|=s Q, then P
−
Q = {P} = γ(P
−
Q), for any selection function γ, and thus P
.−γQ =
P .
( .−4): Let 6|=s Q. For any R ∈ P
−
Q, R 6|=s Q, which implies P
.−γ Q 6|=s Q.
( .−6): Follows directly from Definition 5.8.
LEMMA A.2. Let P ∈ LPA. For any Q,R ∈ LPA, it holds that P
−
Q+R ⊆ P
−
Q ∪ P
−
R.
PROOF. Let P,Q,R ∈ LPA. It follows from SE(Q+R) = SE(Q) ∪ SE(R) and the
definition of P−Q+R that P
−
Q+R = {S ∈ P
−
Q ∪ P
−
R | S 6⊂ S
′ for any S′ ∈ P−Q ∪ P
−
R }. Thus,
P−Q+R ⊆ P
−
Q ∪ P
−
R.
LEMMA A.3. Let P ∈ LPA and γ
′ be determined by a maximised transitive relation.
For any Q,R ∈ LPA, it holds that γ′(P
−
Q+R) ⊆ γ
′(P−Q) ∪ γ
′(P−R).
PROOF. Let P,Q,R ∈ LPA. Assume there exists S ∈ γ′(P
−
Q+R) : S 6∈ γ
′(P−Q) ∪ γ
′(P−R).
Then S 6∈ γ′(P−Q) and S 6∈ γ
′(P−R). Case 1: If S 6∈ P
−
Q, this means that S ∈ P
−
R by
Lemma A.2. From Definition 5.5 it follows that there exists S′ ∈ P−R : S ⊂ S
′, a contra-
diction since S ∈ P−Q+R. Case 2: S ∈ P
−
Q. Follows analogously as Case 1.
THEOREM 5.4: Let γ′ be determined by a maximised transitive relation. The con-
traction operator .−γ′ satisfies (
.−7).
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PROOF. Let P,Q,R ∈ LPA and r ∈ (P
.−γ′Q)∩(P
.−γ′R). This means that r ∈
⋂
γ′(P−Q)
and r ∈
⋂
γ′(P−R). By Lemma A.3, we have for all S ∈ γ
′(P−Q+R) : r ∈ S, so that
r ∈
⋂
γ′(P−Q+R). Thus, (P
.−γ′ Q) ∩ (P
.−γ′ R) ⊆ P
.−γ′ (Q+R).
THEOREM 5.5: An operator .−γ is a partial meet contraction operator for P ∈ LPA
determined by a selection function γ for P iff .−γ satisfies (
.−1b)–( .−4b).
PROOF. We first show that a partial meet contraction operator .−γ for P determined
by a given selection function γ for P satisfies ( .−1b)–( .−4b).
( .−1b): Follows from ( .−1b) = ( .−2) and satisfaction of ( .−2).
( .−2b): Follows from ( .−2b) = ( .−4) and satisfaction of ( .−4).
( .−3b): Let r ∈ P . Assume that for all P ′ with P .−γ Q ⊆ P ′ ⊂ P and P ′ 6|=s Q, it holds
that P ′ ∪ {r} 6|=s Q. In particular, for each R ∈ P
−
Q with P
.−γ Q ⊆ R, this implies
R ∪ {r} 6|=s Q. As each R is subset-maximal by Definition 5.7, it follows that r ∈ R and
thus r ∈ P .−γ Q.
( .−4b): For all P ′ ⊆ P , let P ′ 6|=s Q iff P ′ 6|=s R. Then P
−
Q = P
−
R by Definition 5.7 and so
γ(P−Q) = γ(P
−
R) as well as
⋂
γ(P−Q) =
⋂
γ(P−R). Thus, P
.−γ Q = P
.−γ R by Definition 5.8.
We now show that any operator ◦γ for P satisfying (
.−1b)–( .−4b) is a partial meet
contraction operator for P determined by some selection function for P . We first find
a selection function γ for P. Let γ be such that (i) if P−Q = ∅, then γ(P
−
Q) = ∅ and (ii)
γ(P−Q) = {R ∈ P
−
Q | P ◦γ Q ⊆ R } otherwise.
We begin by showing that γ is a function. If P−Q = P
−
R, then P ◦γ Q = P ◦γ R by (
.−4b).
This means γ(P−Q) = γ(P
−
R) according to our definition of γ.
We next show that γ is a selection function. Clearly, γ(P−Q) ⊆ P
−
Q by our definition of
γ. If P−Q 6= ∅, then 6|=s Q by Definition 5.7 and thus P ◦γ Q 6|=s Q by (
.−2b). It follows
from P ◦γ Q ⊆ P due to (
.−1b) that there exists R ∈ P−Q such that P ◦γ Q ⊆ R. From our
definition of γ we therefore obtain that γ(P−Q) 6= ∅.
Finally, we show that ◦γ is a partial meet contraction operator for P , that is, P ◦γQ =
P if |=s Q and P ◦γ Q =
⋂
γ(P−Q) otherwise. Consider first the limiting case that |=s Q.
If r ∈ P \ (P ◦γ Q), then there exists P ′ such that P ◦γ Q ⊆ P ′ ⊂ P and P ′ 6|=s Q but
P ′ ∪ {r} |=s Q by (
.−3b). This is a contradiction since |=s Q. Therefore, it holds for all
r ∈ P that r ∈ P ◦γ Q, that is, P ⊆ P ◦γ Q. Since P ◦γ Q ⊆ P by (
.−1b), we can conclude
P ◦γ Q = P .
Assume now that 6|=s Q. Let r ∈ P \ (P ◦γ Q). If P
−
Q = ∅, then it follows from (
.−2b)
and ( .−3b) that P ◦γ Q = ∅. Since γ(P
−
Q) = ∅ by our definition of γ, we thus have
P ◦γ Q =
⋂
γ(P−Q). If P
−
Q 6= ∅, then it follows directly from our definition of γ that
P ◦γ Q ⊆
⋂
γ(P−Q). To show the converse inclusion, first assume the case that P 6|=s Q.
This implies that for any P ′ ⊆ P it holds that P ′ 6|=s Q. Applying (
.−3b), we obtain
P \ (P ◦γ Q) = ∅ and thus P ⊆ P ◦γ Q. From (
.−1b) it follows that P ◦γ Q = P . Moreover,
due to the assumption that P 6|=s Q and Definition 5.7, we have P
−
Q = {P}. By our
definition of γ, we obtain γ(P−Q) = {P} and thus
⋂
γ(P−Q) = P and can conclude P ◦γQ =⋂
γ(P−Q). Lastly, assume the case that P |=s Q. We will show that r 6∈ P ◦γ Q implies
r 6∈
⋂
γ(P−Q). If r 6∈ P , then r 6∈ P ◦γ Q by (
.−1b) and r 6∈
⋂
γ(P−Q) by Definition 5.7.
Now assume r ∈ P \ (P ◦γ Q). According to (
.−3b), then there exists P ′ such that
P ◦γ Q ⊆ P ′ ⊂ P and P ′ 6|=s Q but P ′ ∪ {r} |=s Q. This means that there exists R ∈ P
−
Q
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such that P ′ ⊆ R and r 6∈ R. Since P ◦γ Q ⊆ P ′ ⊆ R, we obtain from our definition of γ
that R ∈ γ(P−Q). We can thus conclude from r 6∈ R that r 6∈
⋂
γ(P−Q).
PROPOSITION 5.3: The contraction operator .−γ satisfies (
.−5b), ( .−6b), and ( .−8b).
PROOF.
( .−5b): Since ( .−5b) = ( .−3) and .−γ satisfies (
.−3), .−γ also satisfies (
.−5b).
( .−6b): Since ( .−6b) = ( .−6) and .−γ satisfies (
.−6), .−γ also satisfies (
.−6b).
( .−8b): Follows from satisfaction of ( .−3b) and Proposition 4.1.
LEMMA 6.1: Let P,Q,R ∈ LPA and  be an ensconcement associated with P .
a) If P +Q is satisfiable, then cut(Q) = P .
b) If Q is satisfiable, then cut(Q) +Q is satisfiable.
c) If Q is not satisfiable, then cut(Q) = ∅.
d) If Q |=s R, then cut(Q) ⊆ cut(R).
e) cut(Q+R) ⊆ cut(Q).
f) If cut(Q) |=s R, then cut(Q +R) = cut(Q).
PROOF.
a) – d) Follow directly from Definition 6.2.
e) Follows directly from d).
f) Let cut(Q) |=s R. It follows that SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(R), which implies
SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ∩ SE(R) 6= ∅ since SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ by Definition 6.2.
We can rewrite this as SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q+R) 6= ∅. Thus, cut(Q) ⊆ cut(Q+R) by
Definition 6.2. By Lemma 6.1 e), we obtain cut(Q) = cut(Q+R).
PROPOSITION 6.1: Let P,Q ∈ LPA and  be an ensconcement associated with P .
Then SE(P ∗ Q) = SE(cut(Q) +Q).
PROOF. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and  be an ensconcement associated with P . If Q is not
satisfiable, then by Definition 6.3 we have SE(P ∗ Q) = SE(P + Q) = ∅ and by
Lemma 6.1 c) we also have SE(cut(Q)+Q) = SE(Q) = ∅. Otherwise, by Definition 6.3,
P ∗Q = cut(Q)∪(P ∗Q)\(cut(Q)+Q)∪Q, which means SE(P ∗Q) = SE(cut(Q))∩
SE((P ∗ Q) \ (cut(Q) + Q)) ∩ SE(Q). Since for any r ∈ (P ∗ Q) \ (cut(Q) + Q) :
SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r), we obtain SE(P ∗ Q) = SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q).
THEOREM 6.1: The revision operator ∗ satisfies (∗1)–(∗6) and (∗8).
PROOF.
(∗1): Follows directly from Definition 6.3.
(∗2): Follows directly from Definition 6.3.
(∗3): If Q is not satisfiable, then P ∗ Q = P +Q by Definition 6.3. Otherwise, for any
r ∈ P ∗ Q it holds that r ∈ P ∪Q, which implies P ∗ Q ⊆ P +Q.
(∗4): If P +Q is satisfiable, then cut(Q) = P by Lemma 6.1 a). Since SE(P ) ⊆ SE(r)
for all r ∈ P , it follows from Definition 6.3 that P ∗ Q = P +Q.
(∗5): If Q is not satisfiable, then P ∗ Q = P + Q is not satisfiable. Now assume Q is
satisfiable. By Lemma 6.1 b) it holds that cut(Q) + Q is satisfiable. Since P ∗ Q ≡s
cut(Q) +Q by Proposition 6.1, it follows that P ∗ Q is satisfiable.
(∗6): Follows directly from Definition 6.3.
(∗8): Let (P ∗ Q) + R be satisfiable. By Definition 6.3, this means SE(cut(Q)) ∩
SE((P ∗Q)\cut(Q))∩SE(Q)∩SE(R) 6= ∅ and thus SE(cut(Q))∩SE(Q)∩SE(R) 6= ∅.
From Lemma 6.1 e) and Definition 6.2 it follows that cut(Q + R) = cut(Q).
Then obviously SE(cut(Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q) = SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q), which implies
SE(cut(Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q) ∩ SE(R) ⊆ SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q). It thus also holds that
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{ r ∈ P | SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) } ⊆ { r ∈ P | SE(cut(Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q + R) ⊆
SE(r) }, from which we can conclude that (P ∗ Q) +R ⊆ P ∗ (Q+R).
THEOREM 6.2: The revision operator ∗ satisfies (∗1b), (∗2b), and (∗5b).
PROOF.
(∗1b): Since (∗1b) = (∗2) and ∗ satisfies (∗2), ∗ also satisfies (∗1b).
(∗2b): Since (∗2b) = (∗3) and ∗ satisfies (∗3), ∗ also satisfies (∗2b).
(∗5b): If Q is satisfiable, then by Lemma 6.1 b) it holds that cut(Q) +Q is satisfiable.
Since P ∗Q ≡s cut(Q)+Q by Proposition 6.1, it follows that P ∗Q is satisfiable.
LEMMA 6.2: Let P,Q,R ∈ LPA.
a) If P 6|=s Q, then cut
−
(Q) = P .
b) If 6|=s Q, then cut
−
(Q) 6|=s Q.
c) If |=s Q, then cut
−
(Q) = ∅.
d) If Q |=s R, then cut
−
(R) ⊆ cut
−
(Q).
e) cut−(Q) ⊆ cut
−
(Q +R).
f) If cut−(Q) |=s R, then cut
−
(Q+R) = cut
−
(Q).
g) If cut−(Q) 6|=s R, then cut
−
(Q+R) = cut
−
(R).
PROOF.
a) – d) Follow directly from the definition of cut−(Q).
e) Follows directly from d).
f) Assume cut−(Q + R) 6= cut
−
(Q). Then cut
−
(Q) ⊂ cut
−
(Q + R) by Lemma 6.2 e). Let
r ∈ cut−(Q + R) \ cut
−
(Q). This means SE({ r
′ ∈ P | r  r′ }) ∩ SE(Q+R) 6= ∅ and
SE({ r′ ∈ P | r  r′ }) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ by Definition of cut−(Q). Thus, SE({ r
′ ∈ P | r 
r′ }) ∩ SE(R) 6= ∅. Furthermore, cut−(Q) ⊆ { r
′ ∈ P | r  r′ } by Definition of cut−(Q).
We therefore obtain SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(R) 6= ∅, which implies cut
−
(Q) 6|=s R.
g) Assume cut−(Q +R) 6= cut
−
(R). Then cut
−
(R) ⊂ cut
−
(Q + R) by Lemma 6.2 e). Let
r ∈ cut−(Q + R) \ cut
−
(R). This means SE({ r
′ ∈ P | r  r′ }) ∩ SE(Q+R) 6= ∅ and
SE({ r′ ∈ P | r  r′ }) ∩ SE(R) = ∅ by Definition of cut−(R). Thus, SE({ r
′ ∈ P | r 
r′ }) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ and so { r′ ∈ P | r  r′ } ⊆ cut−(Q) by Definition of cut
−
(Q). We
therefore obtain SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(R) = ∅, which implies cut
−
(Q) |=s R.
PROPOSITION 6.2: Let P,Q ∈ LPA and  be an ensconcement associated with P .
Then SE(P .− Q) ∩ SE(Q) = SE(cut
−
(Q)) ∩ SE(Q).
PROOF. If |=s Q, then SE(Q) = ∅ and SE(P
.−Q)∩SE(Q) = SE(cut
−
(Q))∩SE(Q).
Otherwise, by Definition 6.4, P .− Q = cut
−
(Q) ∪ (P
.− Q) \ cut
−
(Q), which means
SE(P .− Q) ∩ SE(Q) = SE(cut
−
(Q)) ∩ SE((P
.− Q) \ cut
−
(Q)) ∩ SE(Q). For all r ∈
(P .−Q) \ cut
−
(Q) we have SE(cut
−
(Q))∩SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r), so that we obtain SE(P
.−
Q) ∩ SE(Q) = SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q).
THEOREM 6.3: The contraction operator .− satisfies (
.−1)–( .−4) and ( .−6)–( .−8).
PROOF.
( .−1): Follows directly from Definition 6.4.
( .−2): Follows directly from Definition 6.4.
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( .−3): If P 6|=s Q, then cut
−
(Q) = P by Lemma 6.2 a). Since SE(P ) ⊆ SE(r) for all r ∈ P ,
this means SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) for all r ∈ P and by Definition 6.4 we thus
have P .− Q = P .
( .−4): Let 6|=s Q. If P 6|=s Q, then P
.− Q = P 6|=s Q by (
.−3). Now assume P |=s Q
and let S = SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q). For each r ∈ P , if r ∈ P
.− Q, then S ⊆ SE(r) by
Definition 6.4, and thus S ⊆ SE(P .−Q). Since S∩SE(Q) = ∅, we obtain P
.−Q 6|=s Q.
( .−6): Follows directly from Definition 6.4.
( .−7): For all r ∈ (P .− Q) ∩ (P
.− R) : SE(cut
−
(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) and
SE(cut−(R)) ∩ SE(R) ⊆ SE(r). This implies SE(cut
−
(Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) since
cut−(Q) ⊆ cut
−
(Q + R) by Lemma 6.2 e) and SE(cut
−
(Q + R)) ∩ SE(R) ⊆ SE(r) since
cut−(R) ⊆ cut
−
(Q+R) by Lemma 6.2 e). From SE(Q+R) = SE(Q)∪SE(R) we obtain
SE(cut−(Q+R)) ∩ SE(Q+R) ⊆ SE(r) and thus r ∈ P
.− (Q +R) by Definition 6.4.
( .−8): Assume SE(P .− (Q + R)) * SE(Q). Then, SE(cut
−
(Q + R)) ∩ SE((P
.− (Q +
R)) \ cut−(Q + R)) * SE(Q), which means SE(cut
−
(Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ (i). Recall
that cut−(Q) is maximal and cut
−
(Q) ⊆ cut
−
(Q + R) (ii) by Lemma 6.2 e). From (i)
and (ii) it follows that cut−(Q) = cut
−
(Q + R). Since SE(Q) ⊆ SE(Q+R), we have
SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(cut
−
(Q+R)) ∩ SE(Q+R), which implies P
.− (Q+R) ⊆
P
.− Q by Definition 6.4.
THEOREM 6.4: The contraction operator .− satisfies (−1b), (−2b) and (−5b)–(−8b).
PROOF.
( .−1b): Follows from ( .−1b) = ( .−2) and satisfaction of ( .−2).
( .−2b): Follows from ( .−2b) = ( .−4) and satisfaction of ( .−4).
( .−5b): Follows from ( .−5b) = ( .−3) and satisfaction of ( .−3).
( .−6b): Follows from ( .−6b) = ( .−6) and satisfaction of ( .−6).
( .−7b): If |=s Q+R, then P
.− (Q+R) = P by Definition 6.4 and |=s Q and |=s R, which
means P .− Q = P and P
.− R = P by Definition 6.4. Now let 6|=s Q+ R. We proceed
by cases.
Case 1: cut−(Q) |=s R. Then cut
−
(Q + R) = cut
−
(Q) by Lemma 6.2 f). Let r ∈ P
.−
(Q+R). This means r ∈ P by ( .−2) and SE(cut−(Q+R))∩SE(Q+R) ⊆ SE(r) by Defi-
nition 6.4. It follows that SE(cut−(Q +R)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r). Due to the case assump-
tion, we obtain SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) and thus r ∈ P
.− Q by Definition 6.4.
Now let r ∈ P .− Q. This means r ∈ P by (
.−2) and SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r)
by Definition 6.4. Then SE(cut−(Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) due to the case assump-
tion. It also follows from the case assumption that SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(R) = ∅ and
SE(cut−(Q + R)) ∩ SE(R) = ∅. We thus have SE(cut
−
(Q + R)) ∩ (SE(Q) ∪ SE(R)) ⊆
SE(r), that is, SE(cut−(Q+R)) ∩ SE(Q+R) ⊆ SE(r). Therefore, r ∈ P
.− (Q+R) by
Definition 6.4.
Case 2: cut−(R) |=s Q. Follows analogous to Case 1 so that P
.− (Q +R) = P
.− R.
Case 3: cut−(Q) 6|=s R and cut
−
(R) 6|=s Q. Then cut
−
(Q + R) = cut
−
(Q) = cut
−
(R)
by Lemma 6.2 g). Let r ∈ P .− (Q + R). This means r ∈ P by (
.−2) and SE(cut−(Q +
R))∩ SE(Q+R) ⊆ SE(r) by Definition 6.4. We thus have SE(cut−(Q+R)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆
SE(r) and SE(cut−(Q + R)) ∩ SE(R) ⊆ SE(r). From the case assumption it follows
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that SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) and SE(cut
−
(R)) ∩ SE(R) ⊆ SE(r). This means
r ∈ P .− Q and r ∈ P
.− R by Definition 6.4 and therefore r ∈ (P
.− Q) ∩ (P
.− R).
( .−8b): Assume SE(P .− Q) ⊆ SE(Q) ∪ SE(r), that is, SE(P
.− Q) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r).
By Proposition 6.2, SE(P .− Q) ∩ SE(Q) = SE(cut
−
(Q)) ∩ SE(Q), so that we obtain
SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r). This implies r ∈ P
.− Q by Definition 6.4. We can
conclude r ∈ P by ( .−2).
THEOREM 7.1: Let P,Q ∈ LPA. For any selection function γ, there exists an enscon-
cement  associated with P such that P ∗γ Q = P ∗ Q.
PROOF. Let P,Q ∈ LPA and γ be a selection function that determines the outcome
of P ∗γ Q. By S = (P ∗γ Q) ∩ P =
⋂
γ(PQ) we denote the subset of P that is retained
in the revision and by S′ = P \ S the subset of P that is discarded. We can then create
an ensconcement  associated with P that has a minimal number of levels, such that
for all r ∈ S and for all r′ ∈ S′: r′ ≺ r. We now show that (P ∗ Q) ∩ P = S. Clearly,
cut(Q) = S by Definition 6.2, which implies S ⊆ (P ∗Q)∩P . Assume that there exists
an r′ ∈ S′ with SE(cut(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r′). Then for each selected compatible set
R ∈ γ(PQ) it would hold that r′ ∈ R because R is maximal by the definition of PQ. Yet
this implies r′ ∈ S, a contradiction.
THEOREM 7.2: Let P,Q ∈ LPA. For any selection function γ, there exists an enscon-
cement  associated with P such that P .−γ Q = P
.− Q.
PROOF. Follows analogously to the proof of Theorem 7.1.
LEMMA A.4. Let R be a subset-ensconcement associated with some P ∈ LPA and
R ⊆ P . For any rule r ∈ R, it holds that R R {r}.
PROOF. Since R |=s {r}, it follows from Conditions (R1) and (R2) that {r} 6≺R
R.
THEOREM 7.3: Let P,Q ∈ LPA,  be an ensconcement associated with P , and R a
subset-ensconcement associated with P such that {r} R {r′} iff r  r′ for all r, r′ ∈ P .
Then P ∗ Q = P ∗R Q (or P
.− Q = P
.−R Q, alternatively).
PROOF. Let P,Q ∈ LPA,  an ensconcement associated with P , and R a subset-
ensconcement associated with P . Assume that {r} R {r′} iff r  r′ for all r, r′ ∈ P .
From LemmaA.4 it is clear that cut(Q) = cutR(Q), which implies for all r ∈ (P ∗Q)\
Q : SE(cutR(Q))∩SE(Q) ⊆ SE({r}), and thus P ∗Q ⊆ P ∗RQ. Since SE(R) ⊆ SE(r)
for any R ⊆ P and each r ∈ R, we also have P ∗R Q ⊆ P ∗ Q.
Analogous for contraction.
PROPOSITION 7.1: Let P ∈ LPA, γ be a selection function for P , and ∗ an operator
for P such that for any Q ∈ LPA: P ∗Q = (P
.−γ Q) +Q. Then P ∗Q = P ∗γ Q.
PROOF. Let SE(Q) = SE . Then P .−γ Q = P by Definition 5.8 and thus P ∗ Q =
(P .−γ Q) + Q = P + Q = P ∗γ Q by Definition 5.4. Otherwise, SE(Q) 6= SE such that
P−
Q
= {R ⊆ P | SE(R)∩SE(Q) 6= ∅ and for all R′ with R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P : SE(R′)∩SE(Q) =
∅ } = PQ by Definition 5.1. It follows that P ∗Q = (P
.−γ Q)+Q =
⋂
γ(PQ)+Q = P ∗γ Q
by Definitions 5.4 and 5.8.
PROPOSITION 7.2: Let P ∈ LPA, γ be a selection function for P , and
.− an operator
for P such that for any Q ∈ LPA: P
.−Q = P ∩ (P ∗γ Q). Then P
.−Q = P .−γ Q.
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PROOF. Let SE(Q) = ∅. Then P ∗γ Q = P + Q by Definition 5.4 and thus P
.−
Q = P ∩ (P ∗γ Q) = P = P
.−γ Q by Definition 5.8. Otherwise, SE(Q) 6= ∅ such that
PQ = {R ⊆ P | SE(R)∩SE(Q) 6= ∅ and for all R
′ with R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P : SE(R′)∩SE(Q) =
∅ } = P−Q by Definition 5.7. It follows that P
.− Q = P ∩ (P ∗γ Q) = P ∩ (
⋂
γ(P−Q) + Q)
by Definition 5.4. Assume there exists a rule r ∈ Q with r ∈ P \
⋂
γ(P−Q). Then there
exists an R ∈ γ(P−Q) : r 6∈ R, a contradiction since SE(Q) = SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) and R is
maximal. We therefore obtain P .−Q = P .−γ Q by Definition 5.8.
PROPOSITION 7.3: Let P ∈ LPA,  be an ensconcement associated with P , and ∗ an
operator for P such that for any Q ∈ LPA: P ∗Q = (P
.−Q)+Q. Then P ∗Q = P ∗Q.
PROOF. Let SE(Q) = SE . Then P .− Q = P by Definition 6.4 and thus P ∗ Q =
(P .− Q) +Q = P +Q = P ∗ Q by Definition 6.3. Otherwise, SE(Q) 6= SE such that
cut−(Q) = { r ∈ P | SE ({ r
′ ∈ P | r  r′ })∩SE(Q) 6= ∅ } = cut(Q) by Definition 6.2. It
follows that P∗Q = (P .−Q)+Q = { r ∈ P | SE(cut(Q))∩SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) }+Q = P∗Q
by Definitions 6.3 and 6.4.
PROPOSITION 7.4: Let P ∈ LPA,  be an ensconcement associated with P , and
.− an
operator for P such that for any Q ∈ LPA: P
.−Q = P ∩ (P ∗Q). Then P
.−Q = P .−Q.
PROOF. Let SE(Q) = ∅. Then P ∗ Q = P + Q by Definition 6.3 and thus P
.−
Q = P ∩ (P ∗ Q) = P = P
.− Q by Definition 6.4. Otherwise, SE(Q) 6= ∅ such that
cut(Q) = { r ∈ P | SE ({ r′ ∈ P | r  r′ }) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅ } = cut
−
(Q) by definition of
cut−(Q). It follows that P
.−Q = P ∩ (P ∗ Q) = P ∩ ({ r ∈ P | SE(cut
−
(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆
SE(r) } + Q) by Definition 6.3. Assume there exists a rule r′ ∈ Q with r′ ∈ P \ { r ∈
P | SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r) }. Since SE(Q) = SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r
′), it holds that
SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆ SE(r
′). This implies r′ ∈ { r ∈ P | SE(cut−(Q)) ∩ SE(Q) ⊆
SE(r) }, a contradiction. We therefore obtain P .−Q = P .− Q by Definition 6.4.
PROPOSITION 8.1: Let P,Q ∈ LPA and SE(P ) 6= ∅ 6= SE(Q). For any R ⊆ P , if
SE(R) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ and for all R′ ⊂ R : SE(R′) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅, then there exists
M ∈ 2M(P )|Q such that R ⊆
⋃
M.
PROOF. Let P,Q be satisfiable logic programs andR ⊆ P such that SE(R)∩SE(Q) =
∅ and for each R′ ⊂ R : SE(R′) ∩ SE(Q) 6= ∅. Then there exists some aj ∈ A such that
aj ∈ At(Q) and there exist one or more rules ri ∈ R for each aj such that aj ∈ At(ri).
For each ri, there exists a corresponding ri-module M(P )
ri |aj including aj , such that
ri ∈ M(P )ri |aj . It follows from Definition 8.1 that for all remaining rules r
′ ∈ R \ ri :
r′ ∈
⋃
i,jM(P )
ri |aj .
COROLLARY 8.1: Let P,Q ∈ LPA and SE(P ) 6= ∅. Then SE(P ) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ if and
only if SE (
⋃
M(P )|Q) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅.
PROOF. “If”: Since SE(P ) ⊆ SE (
⋃
M(P )|Q), if SE (
⋃
M(P )|Q) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅, then
also SE(P ) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅.
“Only if”: Follows from Proposition 8.1 if Q is satisfiable. Trivial if Q is not satisfi-
able.
THEOREM 8.1: For any P,Q ∈ LPA, there exists a selection function γ for P such
that P ∗γ Q = P \M(P )|Q +
⋃
M(P )|
∗γ
Q + Q (or P
.−γ Q = P \M(P )|Q +
⋃
M(P )|
.−γ
Q ,
respectively).
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PROOF. To prove the equation for revision, we need to show that P \ M(P )|Q +⋃
M(P )|
∗γ
Q =
⋂
γ(PQ) for some γ. Let Z ⊆ P be the set of rules that are eliminated
during the operation of ∗γ per Definition 5.4, i.e., P ∗γ Q =
⋂
γ(PQ) +Q = P \ Z + Q,
and let Z ′ ⊆ P be the set of rules that are eliminated by MODCHANGE.
We first show that Z ⊆ Z ′. Assume that Z ′ = ∅ until the last iteration of the
while-loop. In the last iteration, we have n = |M(P )|Q| and MODCHANGE computes⋃
M(P )|Q ∗γ Q =
⋃
M(P )|
∗γ
Q . Thus, P \ M(P )|Q +
⋃
M(P )|
∗γ
Q = P \ M(P )|Q +
(
⋃
M(P )|Q ∗γ Q). Let MQ denote the set {R ⊆
⋃
M(P )|Q | SE(R) ∩ SE(Q) 6=
∅ and, for all R′, R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P implies SE(R′) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ }. If it holds for all R ∈ γ(PQ)
that R ∩
⋃
M(P )|Q ∈ γ(MQ), then P \M(P )|Q + (
⋃
M(P )|Q ∗γ Q) = ((P \M(P )|Q) ∪⋃
M(P )|Q) ∗γ Q = P ∗γ Q, which implies Z = Z ′.
We now show that Z ′ ⊆ Z. Assume that each revision operation in the following is
the most restrictive type, that is, for any setM , γ(M) = M . Thus, if r ∈
⋂
γ(PQ), then
r ∈ R for allR ∈ PQ. For eachM as specified in the outer foreach loop of MODCHANGE,
let z′ be the set of rules eliminated during the revision of
⋃
M by Q: z′ =
⋃
M\ ((
⋃
M∗γ
Q) \Q). From SE(P ) ⊆ SE(
⋃
M) it then follows that z′ ∩
⋂
γ(PQ) = ∅. Since
⋃
z′ = Z ′,
we obtain Z ′ ∩
⋂
γ(PQ) = ∅.
Analogous for contraction.
COROLLARY 8.2: For any P,Q ∈ LPA, let P \ M(P )|Q = { r ∈ P | for allM ∈
M(P )|Q : r 6∈M } andM(P )|◦Q denote the output of Algorithm 1 for the inputsM(P )|Q,
◦ ∈ {∗,
.−}, and Q. Then P ∗ Q = P \ M(P )|Q +
⋃
M(P )|
∗
Q + Q (or P
.− Q =
P \M(P )|Q +
⋃
M(P )|
.−
Q , respectively) for some ensconcement  associated with P .
PROOF. Follows directly from Theorems 7.1, 7.2, and 8.1.
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